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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK    
1.1 Background and justification of the study 
I believe that the most important components of transitional justice must be the rights of 
victims, which include the right to the truth, the right to acknowledgment, the right to 
reparations and the obligation to take steps to ensure that violation will not occur again.
1
 
In many societies, transition from war to peace or from dictatorship to democracy has 
been dominated by a debate on how best past massive human rights violations can be 
addressed without undermining a fragile and transitional peace.2 Therefore, political 
considerations have entirely shaped legal solutions adopted to bring about transitions 
with less regard to accountability and appropriate remedy for victims of human rights 
abuses and violations.  
Hence, as stressed out by Saffon and Uprimny,3 law has not been seen as a real 
limit to the politics of transition, but has rather been used as an instrument to fulfill its 
goals. Although there has been a „paradigm shift‟ in international law towards more 
recognition of reparations as a human right through the adoption by the United Nations 
General Assembly of the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparations for Gross Violations of Human Rights and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law (the Principles),4 the realisation of the right to reparations in 
transitional justice (TJ) context is negotiated in political transitions whose type affects the 
nature and the implementation of reparations adopted in national jurisdictions.5  
 In the Burundian context of negotiating TJ mechanisms, this study follows my 
previous discussion on „The place of criminal law in the process of TJ in Burundi.‟6 
                                                          
1
 Y Sooka, Foreword to the book by S Pete & M Du Plessis (eds) Repairing the past? International perspectives on 
reparations of gross human rights abuses (2007).  
2
 See a similar point by Roht-Arriaza ‘The new landscape of transitional justice’ in N Roht-Arriaza & J Mariezcurrena 
Transitional justice  in the Twenty-first Century: Beyond truth versus justice (2006) 1. 
3
 P Saffon & R Uprimny ‘Uses and abuses of transitional justice in Colombia’ in Transitional Justice without transition? 
Truth, justice and reparations for Colombia (2006). 
4
 UN/General Assembly Resolution A/RES/60/147, adopted on 16 December 2005. 
5
 J Elster (ed) Retribution and reparations in transition to democracy (2006) 8-9. 
6
 See BD Nibogora ‘The place of criminal law in transitional justice process in Burundi’ (2011) 7 KAS African Law Study 
Library 92-126. 
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Drawing lessons from South Africa, Chile, Peru and Colombia, the study seeks to 
contribute to the debate around reparations in a society where the likelihood of 
prosecutions against suspected perpetrators is limited.  
South Africa7 is chosen because its transitional process is more documented and 
fascinated the governmental delegation of Burundi during the recent negotiations for 
designing TJ mechanisms.8 Peru and Chile are interesting for their relative success and 
their contribution in the development of the right to reparations in Latin America,9 while 
Colombia may be insightful for its judicial approach to reparations. 
1.2 Definitions and scope of the study 
The right to reparations encompasses different forms that may not be comprehensively 
explored in such a limited study.10 Further, there is a difference between reparations, 
reparation and repair. De Greiff writes that the word reparations can be used in two 
different contexts: in a broad or narrow perspective.11 The first refers to international law 
and gives reparations a broad legal meaning, encompassing different forms.12 
Associated with TJ, the second context refers to reparations as programmes designed to 
provide benefits directly to the victims of certain types of crimes, either in material or non 
material form, on individual or collective basis.13 Quite clearly, this study focuses mainly 
on reparations as conceived in the second context, with a bias on material benefits. 
However, it does not depart completely from the perspective of international law 
underscored by the first conception, since TJ remains a by-product of the history of 
international criminal justice.  
                                                          
7
 South African TJ was influenced by the Chilean and Argentinean models. See J Dugard ‘Retrospective justice: 
International law and the South African model’ in AJ McAdams Transitional justice and the rule of law in new 
democracies (1997) 270.   
8
 Nibogora (n 6 above) 121. 
9
 Chileans developed one of the most pro-victim reparations programmes, while Peruvian TJ is acclaimed for its 
compliance with international standards and the collective reparations programme.  
10
 These are restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantee of non-repetition. See the Principles, 
particularly Principles 11&18. 
11
 P De Greiff ‘Justice and reparations’ in P De Greiff (ed) The handbook of reparations (2006) 452. 
12
  n 10 above. 
13
 De Greiff (n 11 above) 452-453.   
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On the other side, reparation consists of returning the victim in the situation he or she 
would have been, had the violation not occurred. This is often referred to as restitutio in 
integrum, i.e integral reparation, which seeks to place the victim in the situation prior to 
the violation. TJ does not tackle the issue of victims‟ right to reparations from this 
perspective, since there is no value or amount of money that can replace the loss of the 
loved one or compensate the emotional suffering caused by sexual assaults. The 
impracticability of individual claims due to evidentiary obstacles and the huge number of 
victims also favour the approach of reparations schemes.14  
Lastly the word „repair‟ means the act of fixing something or someone that has been 
broken, affected or damaged as a result of an unforeseen act or conduct – namely an 
accident or incident. Obviously, this is not a relevant discussion in the context of this 
study. 
This study also refers to vertical and horizontal application of the right to reparations. 
For the purpose of this study, vertical reparations are reparations due to victims by the 
state. Horizontal reparations, on the other side, are reparations that victims can claim 
against third parties, either against individual perpetrators or corporate companies or any 
other non-state actor.15 
 
1.3 Significance of the Study 
The outcome of this study may be significant to the law related to reparations granted in 
TJ. It attracts an attention on the shift in the state‟s obligations on the basis of which 
reparations are made in the context of TJ, namely from an obligation „to respect‟ to more 
emphasis on the obligation „to protect‟. It further discusses how the socio-legal 
dimension of reparations has been overlooked and the quantum of reparations been 
arbitrary fixed rather than being in relation to the harm and loss suffered by victims.   
Finally, this study underscores the fact that reparations programmes involve a 
vertical relation between the victim and the State, regardless a prior establishment of the 
responsibility of the perpetrator. 
 
 
                                                          
14
 J Edelstein ‘Rights, reparations and reconciliation: Some comparative notes’ (1994) CSVR, Seminar 6 available at 
www.csvr.org/wits/papers/papedel.htm (accessed 23 July 2011). 
15
 Those claims are generally lodged in civil lawsuits. 
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1.4 Objectives of the study 
The objectives of this study are to: 
a) Understand how the nature and the application of the right to reparations have 
evolved under international law and „reshaped‟ by transitional justice. 
b) Assess how the right to reparations has been applied through reparations 
schemes in South Africa, Chile, Peru and Colombia in order to identify the 
strengths and weaknesses of each model. 
c) Identify lessons that transitional justice reparations in Burundi can learn from 
those experiences. 
 
1.5  Assumptions 
This study is based on the assumption that granting reparations to victims of human 
rights violations can strategically serve as a provisional form of accountability and can 
give to victims an opportunity to participate effectively in the TJ processes. Pragmatic 
politics of human rights in transitions16 recommend a sequence between the TJ 
mechanisms of truth-telling, reparations and judicial accountability. Further, the state‟s 
attention to reparations demonstrates its commitment to place the victims at the centre 
of the TJ response.17  
The study simultaneously seeks to question the notion that in all reparations 
programmes victims are not compensated in proportion to the harm they suffered.18 
Judicial reparations may be more appropriate and influence the meaningfulness of 
administrative reparations. 
On the other hand, if perpetrators are still key actors with whom the cooperation is 
required for designing all TJ mechanisms, the likelihood of prosecutions is illusory as 
long as they remain in power.19 In the meantime, interim reparations are a viable option. 
                                                          
16
 See Méndez, ‘Accountability’, 271; Mc Carthy, ‘Coming to Terms’, 768; Kiss, ‘Moral Ambition’, 72; A Schaap, 
Political Reconciliation (2005), 21&151 quoted in M Freeman ‘Back to the future: The historical dimension of liberal 
justice’ in Peté and  Du Plessis ( n 1 above) 51.  
17
 UN-OHCHR ‘Rule-of-law tools for post-conflict states: Reparations programmes’ (2008) 2-3.   
18
 De Greiff refers to such a state of affairs as ‘the near impossibility of fulfilling the juridical criterion of justice in 
reparations in massive cases’. See De Greiff  ( n 11 above) 472, endnote 1.  
19
  Roht-Arriaza makes a similar point when she argues that in conditions where prior perpetrators hold a good deal of 
power, and can credibly threaten transitions, amnesties are an inevitable concession. She qualifies this situation as 
‘trading justice for the past in exchange for justice in the future’. See Roht-Arriaza (n 2 above) 2-3. 
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However, without being preceded by the disclosure of truth and followed by the meting 
out of other measures of justice, interim reparations might not be regarded as „true 
reparations‟. 
 
1.6 Research questions 
The study aims to achieve the objectives by addressing two research questions: 
1) How have South Africa, Chile, Peru and Colombia, achieved the right to reparations 
within their respective TJ contexts, and what can be the lessons for the TJ process in 
Burundi? 
This question has three sub-questions: 
a. How have the nature and the application of the right to reparations evolved in 
international law and what is the effect of TJ on this right? 
b. What reparations have South Africa, Peru, Chile and Colombia adopted, and to 
what extent have the benefits remedied the needs of the victims?  
c. What can the TJ debate in Burundi learn from these models, taking into account 
the Burundian specific transition? 
2) To what extent may reparations achieve justice in a society where criminal 
accountability is less achievable in a near future? 
 
1.7 Literature review  
An extensive literature explores reparations either from the perspective of international 
human rights law,20 regional human rights systems,21 or from national laws‟ perspective, 
under the delictual or tort claims.22 Equally abundant are the studies on reparations in 
societies in transition from dictatorship or conflict to democracy. Thus, the issue of 
reparations for victims of gross and systematic human rights violations committed in the 
                                                          
20
 D Shelton Remedies in International Human Rights Law (2005). 
21
 GF Musila ‘The right to an effective remedy under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights’ (2006) 6 
African human Rights Law Journal 442-464; C Sandoval-Villalba ‘The concept of “injured party” and “victim” of gross 
human rights violations in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: A Commentary on their 
implications for reparations’ in C Ferstman et al. Reparations for victims of genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity: Systems in place and systems in making (2009) 243-282. 
22
 GP Fletcher Tort liability for human rights abuses (2008). 
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past has become an exciting subject of academic inquiry. Questions such as „what to 
repair?‟23 „what form should reparations take?‟  „how and who should finance 
reparations?‟ „how far should we go in dealing with the past through reparations?‟24 have 
been answered differently by different scholarships. Some discussed the issue of 
reparations as a form of accountability or considered prosecutions as a form of 
reparations that gives moral satisfaction to victims.25  
In the TJ debate, an interdependent relationship has been acknowledged 
between reparations and other mechanisms of accountability and truth seeking.26 Such 
recognition was pushed further by considering reparations as a key element of TJ,27 or 
simply making a case for meaningful reparations as being capable to bring justice to 
victims, deterrence to society and preventing violations for the future.28  
However, no enough attention has been paid to the changing nature of the right to 
reparation from its association with judicial proceedings and horizontal application to its 
administrative nature shaped by transitional justice exigencies and its vertical application 
against the state under the responsibility to protect. Assuming the responsibility for gross 
violations without proving individual responsibility of the perpetrators, states have 
responded by formulating massive reparations programmes that do not necessarily take 
into account the proportion of the loss or harm in the granting of benefits and services, 
but rather depend on available resources. Thus, states have had discretion in designing 
and implementing such administrative reparations, as they constitute one of the other 
pressing needs which compete in budget allocations according to government‟s 
                                                          
23
 S Pete & M Du Plessis ‘Reparations for gross violations of human rights in context’ in Pete & Plessis (n 1 above) 15-
27. 
24
 T Cowen ‘How far back should we go?’ in J Elster (ed) Retribution and reparation in the transition to democracy 
(2006) 17-32. 
25
 Roberts ‘Justice and rectification’, 26-7; D Markel ‘The justice of amnesty? Towards a theory of retributivism in 
recovering states’ (1999) 49 University of Toronto Law Journal 421, 427-30; Lomasky ‘Reparations’, 33 quoted in 
Freeman ‘Back to the future: The historical dimension of liberal justice’ in Pete & Plessis (n 1 above) 49; Du Plessis (n 
23 above) 149. 
26
 UN-OHCHR (n 17 above) 33.  
27
 F Val-Garijo ‘Reparations for victims as a key element of transitional justice in the Middle East Occupied Territories: 
A legal and institutional approach’ (2010) 6 International Studies Journal 39-62. 
28
 R Mani ‘Reparations as a Component of Transitional Justice’ in K De Feyter et al. (eds) Out of the ashes: Reparations 
for victims of gross and  systematic human rights violations (2005); M Freeman (n 25 above) 38-41. 
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priorities. This led some authors to consider reparations as a political project,29 leaving 
aside its original and powerful judicial aspect capable of securing effective remedies.30 
Thus, the state‟s duty to make reparations based on a court order, which is unequivocal 
and enforceable, differs from a broad commitment to a programme of reparations. 
Ultimately, this study argues that TJ administrative reparations ought to leave a room for 
judicial avenues that may make reparations more meaningful and the obligation to 
provide them more binding, while securing not only vertical but horizontal reparations as 
well. 
 
1.8 Research methodology  
This is a desk research which applies qualitative methods. The methodology used is a 
case-study research on the right to reparations as applied in TJ processes in South 
Africa, Chile, Peru and Colombia. Strengths and weaknesses may inform lessons for 
Burundi.  
The study relies on primary sources consisting of national laws and policies, 
jurisprudence of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, commissions‟ recommendations and 
relevant policy documents, secondary sources consisting of state practice, and 
academic publications. 
1.9 Structure 
The study is divided into five chapters. Chapter one sets an introduction to the study and 
clarifies the common concepts used in the study, particularly, the „right to reparations‟ 
and „vertical or horizontal application‟ of this right in the context of transitional justice. 
Chapter two discusses the right to reparations by tracing it from international law 
perspectives. Chapter three presents the four case studies on the right to reparations: 
                                                          
29
 De Greiff (n 11 above); R Mani (n 28 above) 77.  
30
 On the judicial nature of the remedies, see for instance the jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) in The case of Ilsnami v Nigeria, Comm. 268/2003, para 42; Interights and Others v 
Mauritania (2004) AHRLR 87 (ACHPR 2004) paras 27&30; Cudjoe v Ghana (2000) AHRLR 127 (ACHPR 1999) para 13; 
Bakweri Land Claims Committee v Cameroon (2004) AHRLR 43 (ACHPR 2004) para 55; Aksoy v Turkey, ECtHR, 
Judgment of 18 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions of the ECtHR, 1996-VI, para 98; Aydin v Turkey, 
ECtHR, Judgment of 25 September 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions of the ECtHR, 1996-VI, para 103. 
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South Africa, Peru, Chile and Colombia. The purpose here is to identify best practices 
and lessons that Burundi may emulate from such countries. Chapter four discusses the 
ongoing „negotiations‟ of transitional justice in Burundi and the lessons that should be 
drawn for reparations design. Chapter five presents findings and recommendations of 
the study. Such recommendations are directed at Burundi to take lessons from South 
Africa, Peru, Chile and Colombia in its reparations mode of transitional justice.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE RIGHT TO REPARATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND THE CONTEXT OF TJ 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the human right to reparations from international law 
perspectives. It traces its origin slightly before the emergence of the human rights 
movement which consecrated, in addition to states, individuals as subjects of 
international law. This part also scrutinises the contribution of transitional justice in the 
application and the nature of the right to reparations in relation to the corresponding 
state obligations.  
2.2 Right to reparations under international law 
International law was originally designed to govern interstate relations.31 Therefore, only 
recognised subjects of international law could claim reparations – i.e. states vis-a-vis 
other states – to the exclusion or on behalf of individuals. Thus, following the First World 
War, article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles held Germany solely responsible for all „loss 
and damages‟ suffered by the allies and served as the basis for reparation claims made 
by states against conquered states for wrong committed against civilians.32 Moreover, 
when the Permanent Court of International Justice stated in the Chorzow Factory case 
that „it is a principle of international law that the breach of engagement involves an 
obligation to make reparation in an adequate form‟,33 it referred to interstate reparations 
and not to possible claims by individuals.  
 After the end of the Second World War, individuals were additionally recognised 
as subjects of international law, especially for their protection as they were the main 
victims of the new type of conflicts.34 Subsequently, it became possible to bring an 
                                                          
31
 Pete & Du Plessis (n 22 above) 11. 
32
 As above. 
33
 1927, PCIJ (Ser. A) No 9, 21. 
34
 For an account of the changing theory of conflicts, see Y Spies ‘The changing nature of international conflicts’ 
(2011) unpublished class notes. Estimating that 10 civilians die for every fighter killed in battle. 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
individual claim for reparations before either national courts or an international forum for 
harms suffered due to the conduct of the state or its agents.  
The first legal document to recognise the individual right to redress is the Paris 
Agreement on German Reparations concluded in January 1946. This document included 
a clause allocating a share of war reparations for stateless „non repatriable‟ victims of 
Nazism.35 Although the Agreement seemed to dismiss individual claims in general,36 it 
recognised claims by individual refugees against the future German government.37 
 Further, victims‟ right to reparations has been also considered a key element of 
the human rights system, albeit the fact that it was not always explicitly mentioned in 
human rights instruments as an individual right.38 These instruments emphasise the 
state‟s duty to make reparation for violation of rights.39 However, it is submitted that 
duties of the duty-bearer and entitlements of the rights-claimer are two sides of the very 
same reality. As Val-Garijo writes,40 
[S]uch duty is but the other side of a legal relation involving the violating party and the ... 
victims, who will ultimately be individuals. Such individuals, then, have the right to obtain 
the reparation owed by the violating party, an assertion rooted in a general principle of 
law, (...). 
This general principle informs international law as whole, but its interpretation and 
enforcement vary depending on the branch of international law and the extent to which 
this branch protects the rights of the individual.41 Therefore, I conclude that, as human 
                                                          
35
 Pete& Du Plessis (n 23 above). 
36
JM Hanckaerts & L Doswald-Beck (eds) Customary international humanitarian law (2005) Vol II, 3531. 
37
 Art 8 (1) of the 1946 Paris Agreement on Reparations from Germany quoted in Hankaerts & Doswald-Beck (n 36 
above).  
38
  Val-Garijo (n 27 above) 41. 
39
  As above. 
40
 As above. See also N Roht-Arriaza (ed) Impunity and human rights in international law and practice (1995) 17, 
noting that the obligation to make reparations is 'among the most venerable and most central of legal principles', 
quoted in Musila (n 21 above) 447. 
41
 As above. A similar argument of the self-evidence of the right to remedy has been used to justify the absence of 
specific provisions on the right to reparations in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. See Musila (n 21 
above). 
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rights law and international humanitarian law (IHL) are the two bodies of norms that seek 
the most to protect individuals, the reference they clearly make to the state‟s obligation 
to ensure an effective remedy amounts to an explicit recognition of the individual‟s right 
to reparations.  
Given the distinction that can be drawn between the right to a remedy and the 
right to reparations42 because of the use of the two expressions in human rights 
instruments, the Human Rights Committee has made the interconnectedness clear that 
„without reparation ... the obligation to provide an effective remedy...is not discharged.‟43 
The right to reparations is recognised under different human rights and IHL 
instruments,44 some instruments referring specifically to compensation.45 The latter has 
been underscored by the UN Security Council,46 the jurisprudence of the treaty bodies,47 
regional human rights courts,48 and authoritative scholars.49 Further, the International 
                                                          
42
 It has been argued that the right to remedy is a procedural right to seek redress in a court of law, whereas the right 
to reparation refers to the substantive outcome that will be awarded.  
43
 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 31, para 16. 
44
 Art 8, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration); art 2(3), International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR); art 6, International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD); 
art 14, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); art 39, Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC); art 3, Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (The Hague 
Convention); art 91, Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflict (Geneva Protocol I or Protocol I),etc.  
45
 Art 9(5), ICCPR; art 14(1), CAT; art 24 (4), International Convention on the Protection of All Persons Against 
Enforced disappearance (ICPED); art 15, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families; arts 15(2), 16(4) & 16(5) of the International Labour Organisation, 
Convention No 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal peoples in Independent Countries; art 5 (5), European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;  art 10, American Convention on Human 
Rights; art 21 (2), African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
46
 Already in 1990s, the UN Security Council stated that ‘the work of the International Tribunal shall be carried out 
without prejudice to the right of victims to seek through appropriate means, compensation for damages incurred as a 
result of violations of international humanitarian law.’ See S/Res/827(1993) (my emphasis). 
47
 HRC, General Comment No 31, para 16; Junior Leslie v Jamaica, communication 564/1993 (HRC 1998) para 11; 
Madoui v Algeria, communication 1495/2006 (HRC 2008) para 9; Celis Laureano v Peru, communication 520/1993 
(HRC 1996) para 10. 
48
 Aksoy v Turkey, application 21987/93 (ECtHR 1996) para 112(a); Saloman v Turkey, application 21986/93 (ECtHR 
2000) para 137; Merchants v Colombia, judgment, Ser C no 109 (IACtHR 2005) para 250; Velasquez Rodriguez Case, 
Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4 (1988) para 174. 
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Court of Justice confirmed the individual right to reparations by stating that „Israel has 
the obligation to make reparation for the damage caused to all the natural or legal 
persons‟.50 Arguably, this is also attributable to the shifting focus of international criminal 
justice,51 and an emergence of a new morality, focusing on victims in international 
relations, pointed out early in 21st century by some scholars.52  
This focus on victims‟ rights can be found in the Rome statute and in the statutes 
of other international courts or tribunals. The Rome Statute guarantees reparations and 
victims‟ rights to participation, while offering a „paradigm shift‟ from retributive justice to 
restorative justice.53 Article 75 requires the Court to establish principles relating to 
reparations, and where appropriate the Court may order that the award for reparations 
be made through the Trust Fund provided for in Article 79. 54  The procedure for 
reparations can be triggered by the victim‟s application submitted to the Registry under 
Rule 94, or in exceptional circumstances by the Court on its own motion under Rule 95. 
Pursuant to Rule 97, the Court may grant reparations on an individual or collective basis.  
This victim-orientated goal was underscored where the Court stated that one of 
the main aspects of its mandate is „to provide justice for victims by ordering measures 
                                                                                                                                                                             
49
 LN Henderson, ‘The Wrongs of victims’ rights’ (1985) 37 Stanford Law Review  937 1007, where he observes that 
‘while many propositions advanced on the behalf of past victims may be of marginal concern to them, compensation 
for injuries can be of central importance. If victims have ‘rights,’ the right to recover from the wrongdoer is the most 
tenable individually based right.’ See R Hofmann ‘Reparations for victims of war and non-state actors?’ (2007) 32 
South African Yearbook of International Law 293. 
50
 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I. C. J. 
Reports 2004, para 152-153. 
51
 Roht-Arriaza (n 2 above) 9-13; RG Teitel ‘Transitional Justice Genealogy’ (2003) 16 Harvard Human Rights Journal 
69-94. 
52
 E Barkan The Guilty of Nations. Restitutions and negotiating historical injustices (Baltimore – London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2000); RL Brooks (ed) When sorry isn’t enough. The controversy over Apologies and 
Reparations for Human Injustice (New York – London: New York University Press, 1999) quoted in R Ludi ‘Historical 
reflections on Holocaust reparations’ in Pete & Du Plessis (n 1 above) 120-121. 
53
 See arts 68 to 75 & 79 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC or Rome Statute); See also in 
general GM Musila ‘Restorative justice in international criminal law: The Rights of victims in the International Criminal 
Court’ (2009) Phd Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. 
54
 Art 75 provides for restitution, compensation or rehabilitation that may be ordered after hearing representations of 
all interested parties, including victims. See Art 75(1), (2) & (3) of the Rome Statute. 
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geared towards full repair of harm suffered by them.‟55 Arguably, the reference to the 
Principles as „appropriate guidance‟ for the definition of a „victim‟ in the Lubanga case,56  
and the inclusion of the Principles‟ forms of reparations in the Convention for the 
Protection of all persons against enforced disappearances adopted in 2006 gives them 
the status of customary international law.57  
In the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), victims may be granted reparations 
according to Rule 106 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY and ICTR.58 
However, unlike the ICC, the ICTY and ICTR require victims claiming reparations to 
bring an action before a national court or other competent body. Articles 24(3) of the 
ICTY Statute and 23(3) of the ICTR Statute indicate that a Trial Chamber may order 
return of property and proceeds acquired by criminal conduct. Rule 105 of the ICTY 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence regulates restitution. In the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon, article 25 of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon allows also for 
reparations to the victims.59  
Admittedly, however, the development of reparations as a full-fledged right under 
international law really came into its own with the adoption of the Principles by the 
General Assembly,60 in which the individual right to reparations is systematically and 
                                                          
55
 Situation in the DRC in The Case of Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dylo, Decision on victims’ participation No ICC-
01/04-01/06 (18 January 2008). 
56
 As above. 
57
 TV Boven ‘The United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for Victims 
of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law’ 
United Nations Audiovisual Library (2010) 5, available at http://www.un.org/law/av1  (accessed 12 April 2011). 
58
 Rule 106 of the 2010 Rules of Procedures and Evidences of the ICTR, available at 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/English%5CLegal%5CROP%5C100209.pdf, and the ICTY available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT032Rev45_en.pdf (accessed on 26 October 
2011.) 
59
 For further studies on reparations to victims in international  criminal courts or tribunals, see A Cassese 
International Criminal Law 2
 
ed (2008) 422-423; C Muttukumaru, ‘Reparation to victims’ in Roy S Lee (ed) 
International Criminal Court: The making of the Rome Statute –Issues, negotiations and results (1999) 262; I 
Bottigliero Redress for victims of crimes under international law (2004); S Zappala ‘Reparations to victims’ in A Cassese 
(ed)The Oxford companion to international criminal justice (2009) 487 - 489. 
60
 n 4 above. The Resolution was a result of the work of the Special Rapporteur Theo Van Boven. 
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comprehensively developed.61   The Principles draw much on the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility,62 which can also serve as a basis for individual reparations claims.63 
While Principle 11 provides that „the right to a remedy [...] consists of the victim‟s right to 
equal and effective access to justice; adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm 
suffered; and access to relevant information concerning violations and reparations 
mechanisms‟, Principles 18 to 23 detail different forms of reparations. These include 
restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantee of non-repetition.64 
Therefore, although the Principles do not create new obligations, they add an important 
value to the international regime of the right to reparations. 
First, they take into account the two dimensions of the right to reparations, 
namely the procedural and substantive aspect.65 Secondly, they provide for a broad 
definition of the term „victim‟ to include persons who individually and collectively suffered 
harm as a consequence of conducts that constitute gross violations of international 
human rights law or serious violations of IHL.66  
The Principles extend this definition to the immediate family or dependants of the 
direct victim and persons who suffered harm in intervening to assist victims in distress or 
to prevent victimisation.67 They further recognise the individual and collective dimension 
of victimhood.68  
Reparations must be proportional to the harm so as to wipe out all consequences 
of the violation, the principle being restitutio in itegrum i.e integral reparation. However, 
                                                          
61
 Val-Garijo (n 27 above) 45. 
62
 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Articles on State Responsibility) adopted 
by the International Law Commission in 2001. Boven discusses the Articles on State Responsibility in his study 
submitted together with the Principles in his Report as a Special Rapporteur. See E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8 (2 July 1993) 
16. 
63
 Art 33 (2) of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility states that:’ This part is without prejudice to any right, arising 
from the international responsibility of a State, which may accrue directly to any person or entity other than a State’. 
64
 n 4 above, Principle 18. 
65
 The procedural dimension of the right to reparation entails ‘access to justice’, which means an effective judicial 
remedy as provided under international law. Practically, it is the right to fair and impartial judicial proceedings. See n 
27 above, 46. 
66
 n 4 above, Principle 8 . 
67
 As above. This reflects the distinction between direct and indirect victims. 
68
 As above.  
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the practice of reparations in the aftermath of widespread abuses has failed to apply this 
principle.69 It is submitted that this situation is explained by the fact that TJ reshaped the 
nature and the application of the right to reparations.  
2.3 TJ and reparations: The changing nature and application of the right to 
reparations 
2.3.1 Reparations within the framework of TJ 
TJ has been defined as the conception of justice associated with periods of political 
change, characterised by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive 
predecessor regimes.70  
While some writings rightly situate the emergence of TJ just after the World War 
II, by reference to the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals,71 TJ crystallised as a full-fledged 
subject of academic inquiry during the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War.72 At this 
time, rapid and simultaneous transitions from dictatorship in East and Central Europe, 
and the resolution of long-standing conflicts in different countries, raised the need for 
reckoning with the legacy of human rights violations.73 TJ refers, therefore, to the variety 
of measures adopted in states undergoing transition. It focuses on how emerging 
democracies deal with such violations perpetrated under predecessor regimes, in order 
to deal with the past whilst stabilising the present and building the nation for the future.74  
                                                          
69
 De Greiff (n 11 above) 457-458. 
70
 Teitel (n 51 above) 72. Roht-Arriaza highlight the difficulties of such a definition as it does not tell us what the state 
is ‘transitioning’ to, and the fact that it is limited to a short period while transition may cover many decades. See 
Roht-Arriaza (n 2 above) 1-2.  
71
 S Ratyner & J Abrams Accountability for human rights atrocities in international law: Beyond the Nuremberg legacy 
(1997) quoted in Mani (n 28 above) 54; Teitel (n 51 above) 70.  
72
 Mani (n 27 above) 53; Roht-Arriaza (n 2 above) 1. 
73
 JE Mendez ‘In defense of transitional Justice’ in AJ McAdams Transitional justice and the rule of law in new 
democracies (1997) 2-4. 
74
 These measures have evolved over the time and reshaped TJ models from the primary focus on criminal 
accountability associated with universal values of human[ity] rights to alternative goals of forgiveness and politics of 
reconciliation dictated by particular political and legal conditions and driven by local institutions promoting the ideas 
of amnesty  and truth instead of justice. For a helpful debate, see Teitel (n 51 above) 69-94.   
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Even when defined in a narrow perspective, TJ mechanisms encompass formal 
reparations programmes.75 Indeed, many discussions about reparations have arisen in 
post-conflict situations, within the TJ debate.76 Thus, among the challenges of how to 
address past human rights violations emerges the question of how to redress the harm 
caused by the violation.  
The Principles establish a twofold right to a remedy and reparations which 
encompasses a procedural aspect, access to justice and access to information; and a 
substantive aspect – adequate and effective reparations in various forms.77  
TJ has partly responded to the procedural aspect of the right to reparations. 
Seeking to hold the previous regime accountable by strict application of international 
criminal law through trials, the first generation78 of TJ – referred to as the Nuremberg 
model – secured the access-to-justice component of the right to a remedy.79 However, it 
was questioned whether international accountability is always responsive to the local 
needs of domestic ownership and social justice. 
The second generation reacted to the dilemmas and irregularities generated by 
the previous model. It was questioned whether deterrence is better advanced by 
international accountability, which was viewed as highly selective and less promoting the 
rule of law, as required by national political conditions.80 In reaction to that, the second 
generation of TJ underscored local context and domestic institutions. Peace and 
reconciliation took precedence over the labelled „incompatible‟ values of accountability 
and justice. Beyond individual victims, the important goal was to heal the entire society 
at the price of individual criminal responsibility that was deemed to be a threat to 
                                                          
75
 Roht-Arriaza (n 2 above) 2, discussing the broad and narrow definitions of TJ. 
76
 S Parmentier & K De Keytser ‘Introduction’ in De Feyter  (n 28 above) 1. 
77
 Principles 11 & 18.  
78
 On different generations of TJ, see Teitel (n 51 above) 72-93, situating the first phase of TJ between the end of 
World War II to the end of the Cold War, the second from 1990s to the end of the 20
th
 Century and the last and 
current phase began with the 21
st
 Century. 
79
 Mani (n 28 above) 62.  
80
 JE Mendez ‘In defense of Transitional Justice’ AJ McAdams Transitional justice and the rule of law in new 
democracies (1997) 8-22; Teitel (n 51 above) 74-75. 
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stability.81 The prominent feature adopted as the „second-best‟ alternative was the 
mechanism of truth commissions (TCs). 
This second phase of TJ served the right to reparations in its component of 
access to information. TCs secured the right to truth as a component of reparations. 
Amnesties, where granted, undermined however the access-to-justice component of the 
right to remedy, and consequently the possibility of meaningful reparations that may 
have been ordered by courts. Broadly speaking, the general design of TJ under its 
second phase deprived the administration of the TJ response in general, and particularly 
the right to reparations, from the legality associated with judicial proceedings‟.82 
Therefore, it is contended that TJ processes have sacrificed the procedural 
aspect of the right to reparation as developed in the Principles. Access to justice for 
securing substantive reparations has been overtaken by political programmes of 
reparations.83 Consequently, this has weakened victims‟ claims, downplayed by a formal 
or practical denial of legal actions that may have secured meaningful reparations 
through judicial proceedings.84 The „judicial truth‟ was substituted by a „political truth‟, for 
the purpose of securing a negative peace required by a highly volatile situation.85 The 
perpetrators were often the powerful persons whose cooperation was deemed essential 
for bringing an end to the conflict or the authoritarian regime to step down. 86 This 
enhanced the need for either power sharing, amnesties or safe exile.87 
The third generation of TJ – associated with a parallel run of truth and justice88 – 
is securing the right to remedy in its procedural dimension. However, access to justice 
                                                          
81
 See for a thorough discussion Roht-Arriaza (n 2 above) 2-8; Teitel (n 51 above) 81-82.  
82
 Teitel (n 51 above) 89. 
83
   TCs merely recommended administrative reparations. 
84
 This was the case in South Africa where the Promotion of National Unit and Reconciliation Act 34 0f 1995 rejected 
the individual right to file a civil or criminal lawsuit against perpetrators or against the State for civil damages. In Chile, 
different laws guaranteed the compatibility of reparation grants with a judicial action, but the Supreme Court ruled 
against judicial claims for reparations where the claimant had already benefited from reparations policy. 
85
 Mani (n 28 above) 55. She opposed negative peace, referred to as the post-conflict relative stability, to the positive 
peace – referred to as the long-term peaceful and just society. 
86
 Mendez (n 80 above) 4. 
87
 As above. 
88
 Roht-Arriaza (n 2 above) 8-9. 
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promoted by the next generation of TJ is still failing to secure integral reparation for 
political reasons or practical obstacles, despite the influential pro-victims activities of the 
Victims‟ Fund of the ICC. 
2.3.2 ‘Reshaping’ effect of TJ on the nature and the application of the right 
to reparations 
Individual human rights have been reshaped by transitions as a result of the historical, 
socio-political conditions associated with the context of TJ.89 The right to reparations 
does not stand as an exception to this rule, and has been affected both in nature and in 
application throughout the three phases of TJ.90  
 First, TJ as a field has heightened new principles that differ from the intuitions we 
had of compensatory or corrective justice.91 The conception of the rule-of-law values has 
changed, moving from an over-investment in legal principles of accountability and 
human rights, to the principles of nation-building, community healing and collective 
responsibility.92 Teitel highlights the fact that transitional reparations measures 
recognised individual victims without individuating wrongdoing and presumed the liability 
of the successor regime for the wrongful acts of previous government.93 Therefore, not 
only the legality and the legitimacy of the individual right to reparations against identified 
perpetrators has been weakened, but in some instances the right to secure civil and 
criminal damages, through litigation, was explicitly „outlawed‟.  If this was not the case, 
designed reparations were far from being what would have been declared due to the 
victims by a court of law. Considerations of distributive justice in present and future have 
overridden victims‟ claims for backward-looking justice.94 Admittedly, TJ reparations, 
                                                          
89
 See A Paige ‘How "Transitions" reshaped Human Rights: A conceptual history of transitional justice’ (2009) 31 
Human Rights Quarterly 321-367 
90
 Teitel (n 51 above) 72-93. 
91
 The leading principle is no more restitutio in integrum i.e integral reparation, but to provide benefits and services to 
victims that alleviate their sufferings and, more importantly, prevent violations and victimisation in the future. 
92
 The idea of collective responsibility that justifies state massive reparations was strongly supported by Hannan 
Ardent in rejection of the notion of collective guilty considered as a plea of irresponsibility. See A. Schaap ‘Subjective 
Guilt and Collective Responsibility: Jaspers, Arendt and the “German Problem”’ quoted in Mani (n 28 above) 81.  
93
 RG Teitel Transitional Justice (2000) 146. 
94
 Roth-Arriaza makes a similar point (n 2 above) 3. 
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bearing little or no relation to the material loss, are not truly compensatory from a legal 
viewpoint.95 
 Secondly, the right to reparations in peacetime context may not fall in the same 
„generation‟ of rights as TJ reparations. First-generation rights impose specific and easily 
„implementable‟ obligations upon states.96 Thus, some have qualified these civil and 
political rights as „freedoms‟, given that they mainly impose negative duties on the state: 
to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of the rights or ensure that third parties are 
not undermining their realisation.97 Consequently, states have an obligation of result, i.e 
immediate realisation, as opposed to an obligation of conduct, i.e progressive realisation 
that give rise economic, social and cultural rights, due to resources constraints. Thus, 
with regard to the second-generation rights, the state‟s duty to fulfil entails positive 
obligations to take reasonable steps to ensure a progressive realisation of these rights 
within its available resources.98 
 Admittedly, the right to a remedy and reparations is function of access to justice 
and to fair procedures which would secure substantive damages.99 As such, it may be 
classified as one of the first-generation rights. It imposes on the state a negative attitude 
to refrain from limiting access to justice of victims for the sake of obtaining remedies. 
Consequently, it entails one of these state‟s obligations of immediate effect.  However, 
TJ reparations have not been considered as giving rise to state‟s negative obligations 
immediately claimable. Judicial reparations have been neglected at the expense of 
                                                          
95
 Teitel (n 93 above) 146. 
96
 Immediate realisation of civil and political rights, as compared to progressive realisation of socio-economic rights. 
See Human Right Committee (HRC), General Comment No 31 and Committee on ESCR, General Comment No 3. 
97 
The negative duties result from the state’s obligation to respect the rights, whereas the duty to ensure respect of 
the rights by private persons or entities may of course give rise to positive obligations: to take administrative, 
legislative and judicial measures or to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm caused by the violation. See 
HRC, General Comment No 31, paras 7-8. 
98
 Art 2(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); UN Committee on ESCR, 
General Comment No 3, para 2 (my emphasis). 
99
 In addition to the fact that UN treaty bodies (HRC) and Regional human rights (quasi-) judicial bodies (African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the European Court on Human Rights) insist on judicial remedies and 
leading scholars have asserted that reparations entail twofold intertwined dimension. See D Shelton ‘The UN Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on Reparations: Context and content’ in De Feyter (n 28 above) 20-21. Discussing how the 
remedial right is naturally associated with access to justice and substantive remedies.   
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political programmes of administrative reparations. Not only have states had a positive 
obligation to provide reparations, but with the competing needs of reconstruction, the 
state‟s duties have become obligations of conduct than of result.100 In other words, as it 
is the case for socio-economic rights, states‟ reparations programmes have been 
hostage of resources constraints. As the case may be for socio-economic rights, the 
positive obligation to make TJ reparations and the corresponding victims‟ right has been 
considered as the one to be realised step by step.  
 Moreover, the politics of reconciliation and amnesty-like legislations downplay the 
importance of reparations. This raises the question whether one could talk of a „right‟ 
where it is not claimable before a court of law, a situation which has been qualified as a 
„right without remedies‟.101 
 Thirdly, TJ is associated with considerations that are conducive to politicisation of 
the law.102 Therefore, TJ reparations take into account not what is proportionally 
appropriate so as to wipe out all consequences of violation, but what is deemed 
symbolically and morally appropriate for a political reconciliation.103  
 The right to reparations has also changed in its application. Originally claimed 
between states, it involved a horizontal application between equal subjects of 
international law- the states. With the emergence of the human rights movement in 
international law, the individual right to reparations has been recognised.  
In normal context then, the right to reparations was enforced horizontally against 
an identified violator. Even when the perpetrator was an agent of state, the rule of law 
obliges the court to treat both parties equally.104 However, TJ brought new 
considerations due to the systematic and systemic character of widespread violations, 
the difficulties to establish individual responsibilities105 and the unwillingness or inability 
                                                          
100
 Bearing in mind this less compelling nature of transitional justice reparations, symbolic reparations become more 
visible in a context of scarce resources. See De Greiff (n 11 above) 70. 
101
 Teitel (n 93 above) 147. 
102
 Teitel (as above). Stating that in transitional practices, the law in its reparatory function advances purposes that 
are explicitly political. 
103
 De Greiff (n 11 above) 454; P De Greif ‘Justice and reparations’ in J Miller & R Khumar Reparations: Interdisciplinary 
inquiries (2007) 156-157. 
104
 For the interest of justice, the relationship between the parties is kept horizontal by the Court. 
105
 The judiciary system lacks capacities or has been so involved in the violations that it is no more trusted. 
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of the perpetrators to provide reparations. Among the state‟s obligations, the duty to 
protect serves as a ground on which reparations are due.106  
TJ reparations involve, therefore, a vertical relation between the victim and the 
state. This ground, I argue, also justifies the weakness and difficulties of the victims‟ 
reparations claims against a government that was not responsible of past violations, 
assuming the liability of reparations without individuating responsibilities,107 while facing 
challenges of building a more just future. As a result, reparations were neglected for 
future-oriented policies. 
 Hopefully, the focus of victims‟ rights in the ICC and in the Principles will have 
positive effect on transitional reparatory justice. Reparations to be designed in the new 
generation of TJ should rehabilitate the right to reparations from the neglect that it has 
been dealt with so far.108 
 In summary, I have explored, in this chapter, the place of the right to reparations 
under international law and how the individual right evolved and was reshaped by TJ 
context. The main conclusions are that while the right to reparations has been 
recognised in international law as arising a state‟s obligation of result in instances of 
violation of a right: to provide effective remedy and reparations, TJ has reshaped the 
nature of the state‟s obligation. The same duty shifted in an obligation of conduct that 
states in transition realise to the extent of the possibilities offered by available resources, 
on which there are other competing and equally pressing needs. Downplaying the 
judicial dimension of reparations, states have taken the responsibility to provide 
reparations vertically to victims without individuating responsibilities of the violations, on 
the ground of the duty to protect that the state failed to secure during the period of gross 
violations of human rights. The horizontal reparations that victims would have secured 
either through civil litigation or in amicable settlements against perpetrators or 
accomplices of the violation, have until now not been successful.  
In the following chapter, I proceed with an assessment of how these factors have 
been applied in South Africa, Chile, Peru and Colombia. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ACHIEVING THE RIGHT TO REPARATIONS IN TJ IN SOUTH 
AFRICA, CHILE, PERU AND COLOMBIA: CASE-STUDIES 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter discusses how the factors described above have impacted on reparations 
in South Africa, Chile, Peru and Colombia. After depicting the political and legal 
frameworks, the chapter explores the relationship that reparations generated between 
the victim and the state.  It considers, too, whether reparations policies allowed for 
judicial remedies or not. Finally, I conclude in every case study with an evaluation of the 
strengths and weaknesses. 
3.2 Delivering reparations in South Africa: A long and winding road 
3.2.1 Context 
The South African process of negotiating the end of apartheid was locally driven, without 
or with little external influence.109  As the apartheid regime had become impossible to 
sustain around 1980s-1990s, with a widespread and state-sponsored violence 
perpetrated both by the apartheid regime and the liberation movements,110 formal 
negotiations started in 1990s after the announcement of the liberation of all political 
prisoners and the unbanning of antiapartheid organisations.111 Apartheid has been 
qualified as a crime against humanity.112 It institutionalised both physical and structural 
inter-racial violence in form of killings, torture, disappearances, exploitation, systemic 
subjugation, land dispossession, population transfer, categorisation in racial groups 
where white were legally ensured domination, and other forms of discrimination on racial 
and ethnic grounds.113 The apartheid rule during which gross and systematic violations 
of human rights were committed and the negotiations to transit from this situation to 
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democracy were ended by the first democratic elections held in 1994, which were won 
by the African National Congress (ANC). 
However throughout the negotiation process, the issue of amnesty for 
perpetrators captured more attention than reparative guarantees for victims. Reparations 
were sporadically discussed but no clear policy was ever codified during the peace 
talks.114 The negotiators only considered the possibility of offering opportunity for 
storytelling to victims and truth-telling by perpetrators.115 Therefore, the least that can be 
said is that reparations were included in the process only as an afterthought on which no 
much attention had been focused.116 
3.2.2 Legal and policy framework 
Although reparations were not a major concern for those who negotiated the end of 
apartheid, they appeared in the Interim Constitution in a paragraph before the amnesty 
provisions, but only in abstract terms without any legal character. It was stated that the 
abusing effects of apartheid „can now be addressed on the basis that there is a need for 
understanding, but not for vengeance, a need for reparations but not retaliation, a need 
for Ubuntu but not for victimisation‟.117    
This explicit reference to reparations was removed from the final 1996 
Constitution, which maintained the only provisions related to amnesty. The Constitution 
states that118  
[A]ll the provisions relating to amnesty contained in the previous Constitution are deemed 
to be part of the new Constitution...for the purposes of the Promotion of National Unity 
and Reconciliation Act, 1995 (Act 34 of 1995) [the Act] as amended, including for the 
purposes of its validity.  
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It has been contended, however, that the validity of the amnesty provisions upheld by 
the Constitutional Court provides a basis for reparations.119 But this is only an 
interpretation of the Court‟s ruling which maintained that:120   
[T]he reparations authorised in the Act are not alien to the [amnesty] legislation 
contemplated by the [Postamble]. Indeed, they are perfectly consistent with, and give 
expression to, the extraordinary generous and imaginative commitment of the 
Constitution to a philosophy which has brought unprecedented international acclaim for 
the people of our country. 
This is not the sole possible interpretation, as elsewhere the Court has not explicitly 
acknowledged the link between amnesty provisions and individual reparations. Adopting 
a wider conception of reparations, Justice Mohamed used a language which allowed for 
the government to overrule the needs of the victims in favour of the reconstruction of the 
whole society. Mohamed‟s decision states that:121 
The election of the makers of the Constitution was to permit Parliament to favour the 
„reconstruction of society‟ involving in the process a wider concept of „reparations‟, which 
would allow the state to take into account the competing claims on its resources. 
However, in a minority judgment,122 Justice Didcott held that:123 
Reparation is usually payable by the states, and there is no reason to doubt that the 
postscript envisages our own state shouldering the national responsibility for those. It 
therefore does not contemplate that the state will go scot-free.  
Further, the Act contains a number of provisions on reparations. First, the Act sets the 
granting of reparations as one of the objectives of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC or the Commission).124 The latter has also the mandate to 
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recommend urgent and final reparations. Indeed, section 4 of the Act provides that in 
order to achieve its objectives the Commission shall recommend reparations policy to 
the President, including the measures for urgent interim reparations.125 
Secondly, one of the three committees created by the Act was tasked to deal 
with reparations. The Committee on Reparations and Rehabilitations (CRR) was to 
determine whether or not individuals qualified as victims for the purposes of reparations, 
and to „make recommendations [to the President] which may include urgent measures 
..., as to appropriate measures of [final] reparations to victims.‟126 
 Thirdly, the Act allows the President to establish a Fund from which all money 
payable to victims shall be disbursed.127 This constitutes a clear basis for financial or 
monetary reparations that should be paid to victims. 
 The TRC Report includes reparations and rehabilitation policy proposals.128 
While the Commission insisted on the fact that „it is the President and Parliament who 
will decide what to do with the proposals, and how to implement them‟,129 its proposals 
consist of:130 
- urgent interim reparation (UIR), 
- individual reparation grants (IRG); 
- symbolic reparation, legal and administrative measures; 
- community rehabilitation programmes; and 
- institutional reform. 
Although the TRC was reluctant before, it finally opted for financial grants either as IRG 
or, to some extent, UIR. The Commission argued that the payment of an amount of 
money will help to acknowledge the suffering of victims and to give them agency and 
autonomy to decide what to do with the benefits, to enable access to services and 
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facilities and to subsidise daily living cost, based on their needs.131 Furthermore, 38 
percent of the Commission‟s deponents requested financial assistance as reparations, 
and 90 percent asked for a range of services which can be purchased if money was 
made available – for example education, medical care, housing, etc.132   
 Thus, although the CRR took the responsibility to administer the UIR programme 
to over 14 000 victims in urgent need,133 their implementation took longer than 
expected.134 Commenced in 1998, the implementation process was completed in 2001; 
almost three years after the first payments were made.135 Among all forms of reparations 
recommended by the TRC, the issue of individual financial reparations took the centre of 
the debate in South Africa, and has become an indicator of the government‟s political, 
legal and moral commitment to justice for victims.136  
Engaging in an increasingly acrimonious conflict with the representatives of 
victims, the government stated that „people did not get involved in the struggle for the 
money‟.137 The question is whether this can be a justification for the delayed 
government‟s implementation of the TRC recommendations on reparations.138 The 
unfortunate fact is that government‟s policy on reparations has not been shared with the 
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public, which attracted criticism from the victims‟ organisations.139 Only in 2003, victims 
who testified before the TRC received a once-off final reparations grant of R30 000. This 
was totally different from the TRC‟s recommendation that payments should be made 
each year for six years.140  
Up until 2011, the reparations grants are still controversial.141 The recent 
publication of the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development‟s proposals on 
health and education benefits in the Government Gazette in May 2011 - Notice 282 
Regulations - were criticised from victims‟ organisations in the South African Coalition for 
TJ (SACTJ).142  
In sum, the fight between representatives of victims and civil society on the one 
hand, and the government on the other hand has been characterised as a „call and 
response‟. This means that where government officials comment on one aspect of 
reparations, civil society responds with its counter-arguments and pleas for consultation. 
The issue has been the affordability and individual focus of reparations. Another has 
been the representation and the comprehensiveness of the list of victims, as well as the 
question of consultation and participation, which are answered differently by different 
sides.143  
In a society where the transition was built on a social pact on the basis of 
exchange, namely amnesty for perpetrators, truth for the society and reparations for 
victims,144 it makes sense for the overwhelming majority of victims who have been 
waiting, in vain, for reparations for years to feel betrayed, while the perpetrators who 
qualified for amnesty received it promptly. Reparations does much of the conciliation 
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work to which the transitional process aspired.145 In their absence, the prospect of 
restorative justice is seriously undermined.146 
3.2.3 Vertical vesus horizontal reparations in South Africa 
The right to reparations can be enforced by a victim either horizontally against an 
individual or a non-state actor responsible of the violation, or vertically against the state 
for the conduct of its employees. The TRC Act provides a legal basis for reparations in 
South Africa on basis of which the TRC report recommended financial reparations for 
the victims. The recommended reparations were administrative in nature, involving a 
vertical relation between the State and the victims. Thus, only the State has to pay 
reparations and not the perpetrators.147 
 The TRC Act, in fact, denies the victims of gross human rights violations the right 
of criminal or civil recourse against officials of the apartheid who have been granted 
amnesty.148 Thus, one could say that in South Africa the right to reparations has been 
watered down to the status of an act of charity, one the government does not consider 
itself compelled to execute.149 
Notwithstanding the difficulties inherent to the South African common-law system to 
secure civil or criminal reparations for various form of loss,150 the horizontal enforcement 
of reparations for human rights violations perpetrated during the apartheid era is still a 
viable option against perpetrators who have been denied amnesty,151 and against 
national and transnational companies. Such an action is being pursued in New York 
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under the Alien Tort Claims Act.152 The action in domestic courts is still undermined not 
only by the amnesty, but also the special dispensation process that was enacted to grant 
presidential pardon to those perpetrators who did not benefit from amnesty.153 The 
refusal of victims‟ representation during the process of granting pardons was 
successfully challenged by pro-victims organisation. In the case of Albutt v Centre for the 
Study of Violence and Reconciliation and Others 2010 5 BCLR 391 (CC) (Albutt case), 
the Constitutional Court upheld that victims of crimes under the special dispensation are 
entitled to a hearing before the President makes a decision to grant pardon,154 and the 
decision to exclude them would be inconsistent with principles and values that underlie 
the Constitution, namely accountability, responsiveness, openness and participation of 
victims in seeking to achieve national unity and reconciliation.155 However, in the 
absence or inefficiency of judicial avenues, the state remains vertically liable to mobilise 
funds for meaningful reparations. The calls for a „wealth tax‟ or „reparations tax‟, 
although rejected by the government, can be a starting point to get the beneficiaries of 
apartheid indirectly involved in funding reparations.156 
3.2.4 The judicial versus non-judicial reparations 
The controversial reparations grants in South Africa are non-judicial in nature. Therefore, 
the state‟s duty to provide reparations to victims in the form of financial grants, 
educational or health benefits, etc. remains of administrative character and cannot easily 
be enforced in a court of law. The state has a wider margin of discretion in adopting a 
programme of reparations it deems fair and appropriate, according to the different needs 
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of reconstruction. The sole criterion is the available resources and the competing 
demands for them, as spelled out by Justice Mohamed in the AZAPO case.157  
Justice Didcott added that „the Statute does not ... grant any legally enforceable 
rights in lieu of those lost by claimants whom amnesties hit‟.158 However, judicial 
reparations would have provided victims with a form of satisfaction, sent a message that 
certain practices will not be tolerated and will give victims an enforceable right to 
redress, confirmed for the future the binding nature of the norms violated, and been a 
strong incentive for the state to acknowledge the sufferings of victims and to design a 
meaningful programme of reparations.159 
This study does not argue that the courts have a comprehensive response to the 
problems raised by reparations in the aftermath of gross and systematic violations of 
human rights. Rather, it sees judicial action as a rights-based complement to the holistic 
dealing with the past. 
3.2.5 Strengths and weaknesses of the South African TRC reparations  
The precedence that amnesty has taken in South Africa reminds us that the transition 
was built on a political compromise.160 Therefore, one should not expect many positive 
aspects of a process designed to serve the interests of those from whom a concession 
needed to be made for the transition to happen. But as Roht-Arriaza wrote, in some 
circumstances, „amnesties [are] inevitable concession‟.161  
One of the positive contributions of the reparations designed in South Africa is 
that the individual reparations acknowledge the individual autonomy and dignity by 
giving agency to victims who can, definitely, decide what to do with financial benefits, 
however small they are.  
 One of the criticisms of the South African model is that, although the TRC has 
recommended five components of the reparations policy, the debate has been reduced 
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to the individual financial grants.162 But this is partly justified by the government‟s delay 
and reluctance to implement the TRC recommendations, and its neglect in consulting 
the victims in a meaningful way. 
 The TRC has also been criticized for not identifying all victims entitled to 
reparations and for not making provision for those latecomers who could not attend TRC 
hearings for whatever reason. The TRC has also been taken to task for vesting the 
Amnesty Committee with wide amnesty-granting powers while limiting the powers of the 
CRR to gathering information, identifying victims qualified for reparations and making 
only recommendations of reparations policy to the President. This has made TRC 
process look more perpetrator-orientated than being victim-centred. This resulted in 
anger and frustrations in the victim community. 
Lastly, the TRC reparations focused on individuals rather than on victim and 
perpetrator groups of the apartheid order. As such, it could not address the deep roots of 
apartheid and ensure an effective transition. As Mamdani wrote, the TRC failed to 
capture the real feature of apartheid which „sought to reproduce two distinct identities 
through its legal and institutional apparatus: a racial identity amongst [whites] 
beneficiaries and ethnic particularism amongst [blacks] victims.‟ 163 
This categorisation produced a group victimisation and needed a similar 
approach to design an adequate reparations policy. Collective reparations may have 
been a more suitable approach to group-rooted injustices created by apartheid. The 
government might have considered such approach, rather than struggling with and 
looking down to victims. In the meantime, UIR could have been extended to the 
maximum of victims and rescue those unable to wait for a comprehensively reparations 
plan. 
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3.3 Providing victims of a military regime with reparations in Chile 
3.3.1 Political context 
Chile was under the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet from 1973 to 1990. His 
reign was marked by political executions, disappearances, torture, dismissal from jobs 
for political reasons, political imprisonments, forced expatriation and banning to return to 
the countries, land expulsions, etc.  
 In a plebiscite held in 1988, the majority of Chileans voted for democratic 
elections which brought Patricio Ayelwin into power as the new President.164 However, 
members of the Armed Forces who were involved in the human rights violations 
committed by the previous regime remained powerful, including Pinochet who kept his 
position of the Commandant-in-Chief of the Army.165 Before leaving office, Pinochet and 
his collaborators passed several laws to make it very difficult to change the structure in 
the administration and to allow the armed forces to keep substantive advantages and a 
privileged voice in the political decision-making process.166 Furthermore, the 1980 
Constitution distinguished between various matters to be regulated by law and, 
therefore, increased the obstacles for amending things which the military Junta deemed 
unchangeable in the future.167 In this context, a percentage of representation in 
Congress was guaranteed and nine senators were appointed by the Supreme Court, the 
Council of National Security and General Pinochet in his capacity of President of the 
Republic.168 This prevented the incoming government of Aylwin from having an absolute 
majority in both chambers.169 
 One month after the new President took his office, a National Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (NTRC or the Commission)170 was created with the purpose 
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of disclosing the all truth on serious violations of human rights, committed for political 
reasons by agents of the predecessor regime or by private individuals, which resulted in 
death or disappearances. The Report of the Commission – the Retting Report – of 1991 
contained a chapter on reparations understood by the Commission as „a series of 
actions that express acknowledgement and acceptance of the responsibility that falls to 
the State due to the actions and situations presented in this report.‟171 Although 
contested by the Army and the Supreme Court, the various reparations measures 
identified in the Report served as a basis for a Bill sent to the Congress for the 
implementation of these measures. The reparations were meant to restore the moral 
dignity of the victim, and to achieve a better quality of life for those families directly 
affected.172 
 The Group of the Families of Disappeared Detainees (AFDD) criticised the 
reparations proposed by the government on the basis that the proposal presumed the 
death of the victims.173 It further expressed its mistrust in the creation of a public interest 
corporation with no judicial faculties to investigate the whereabouts of the disappeared 
detainees, and condemned as unfair, the „single pension‟ for not taking into account all 
family members of the victims.174 The NTRC identified, in fact, different groups of victims 
of human rights violations and political violence: 2 298 persons died for political reasons 
among which 2 130 were victims of human rights violations, 168 victims of political 
violence, 979 persons were listed as disappeared detainees, and 634 cases for which no 
satisfactory conclusion was reached.175 
 
3.3.2 Legal setting 
Before leaving the power, Pinochet and his team passed several laws known among 
Chileans as „leyes the amarre’, i.e laws to tie things up. The NTRC was established by 
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the Supreme Decree 355 of 25 April 1990 to investigate „serious violations‟176 of human 
rights perpetrated between 11 September 1973 and 11 March 1990, and handed its final 
report in February 1991, which included proposals for economic, symbolic and social 
reparations.177  
Moreover, the Report‟s recommendations on reparations and the proposed bill 
for their implementation were criticised by the civil society. But in the end, the law 
enacted incorporated the proposals by the AFDD.178 Three categories of reparations 
were established: symbolic reparations, legal and administrative reforms and financial 
reparations. Under this last category, a monthly reparations pension of 535US$, to be 
expressly requested by the victims, was established.179 One compensatory bonus of 12 
months‟ pension was also distributed in different proportions to beneficiaries.180 Law 
19.123 stated that the reparations pension was compatible with any other grant, 
including the compensatory damages that could have resulted from civil litigation.181 
 
3.3.3 Implementing the NTRC reparations proposals  
The TRC recommendations were implemented by a public institution created by Law 
19.123 - the National Corporation for Reparations and Reconciliation (NCRR). The 
proposals of the NTRC were enriched by views from the victims‟ organisations, unlike in 
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South Africa.182 But due to the political context described above, the reparations 
distributed were far from what the victims were demanding, and what the government 
itself would have wished to deliver.183 Material reparations included the payment of a 
pension, social benefits such as healthcare facilities and educational assistance and 
other needs.184 The Commission justified the social benefits by the fact that many of the 
individuals who were killed or disappeared might have qualified for social benefits, which 
their relatives had never received or had received partially.185  
The NCRR had also the powers to validate new cases of victims and to 
investigate the whereabouts of the victims who disappeared after being arrested and of 
those whose bodies have not been found, although they have been legally recognised 
as dead.186 The Corporation was taken over by the Follow-up Programme for Law 
19.123, the Human Rights Programme of the Ministry of the Interior, which initiated the 
Roundtable discussion between 1999 and 2000, and the 2003 government‟s proposal of 
the programme to solve the pending issues related to Pinochet‟s era. In October 2004, 
Law 19.123 was amended by Law 19.980, passed for broadening and adding new 
benefits for the next of kin of the victims, including a 50 percent increase in the amount 
of the monthly pension, the empowerment of the President to grant a maximum of 200 
non-contributory pensions, and for broadening the scope of the health benefits.187  
What counts more seems to be the political commitment of coming governments 
to face the issue of reparations. The permanent character of the benefits and the 
continuous design of reparations programmes in Chile are an example of a government 
which dared to confront its past, bearing in mind that „there is no tomorrow without 
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 Asserting that the patrimonial and psychological effects of many years of violations had to be redressed with 
money and other types of financial support, the Commission suggested that this support should be discussed with the 
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yesterday‟.188 Such a commitment can further be found in the treatment reserved to the 
tortured and the political prisoners.189   
So far the process of reparations seems to have followed four steps: the 
establishment of the NTRC, which resulted in the Retting Report and; the creation of the 
NCRR to implement the Retting Report‟s recommendations; and the Dialogue 
Roundtable established in 1999, when General Pinochet was no longer Commander-in-
Chief of the Army. During this dialogue the army acknowledged its involvement in the 
death of Chileans thrown into the sea or secretly buried.190 Later, the National 
Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture was established and produced the 
Valech Commission‟s Report. All these efforts were to seek for truth, justice and to 
deliver reparations to the survivors.191 Amongst the reparations programmes, the most 
visible was the comprehensive healthcare for victims of human rights violations 
(PRAIS).192 It was, however, completed by other programmes such as reparations for 
returning exiles in Chile, which was meant to provide assistance for reincorporation of 
returnees;193 socio-economic reparations and reincorporation of political prisoners, 
designed to release and support financially the former prisoners to reintegrate the 
society;194 recognition of politically dismissed victims by granting them a minimal single 
pension; reparations for peasants excluded from agrarian reform or excluded from their 
lands, and reparations for the victims of torture and political imprisonment identified by 
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 The expression is the title of the Human Rights proposal submitted to the Congress in 2003 by the President 
Ricardo Lagos. It included measures aiming at uncovering the truth about disappeared detainees. 
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 The Decree creating NTRC did not allow for registering them as victims, but a reparations programme was 
designed for them. Quiroga (n 165 above) 114. 
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the 2003 Commission.195 The different pensions were not incompatible and one could 
cumulate three or four pensions of different kinds. 
Moreover, the NTRC recommendations in the area of social welfare were meant to 
repair the moral as well as the material harm that the immediate relatives of the victims 
have suffered from.196 This wording suggests that the reparations grants sought to 
compensate the loss and harm suffered, taking into account the irreparable loss of a 
family member and what many years of searching does to a family and its fortunes.197 It 
may also imply that the social benefits were to be distributed in instances where the 
violations have only led to the death or disappearance of the victim, since the report 
talks of „the relatives of the victims‟ and not the victims. This conclusion can be 
corroborated by the criticism that the Commission did not include the survivors of torture 
and political imprisonment on the list of victims.198  
Regarded as measures to support a process in which the quality of life of the victim‟s 
family members is enhanced, the social welfare measures were to be permanent rather 
than temporary. This differs from the South African case where the six years‟ payment 
period suggested by the TRC was reduced to a one-time payment of R30 000.199 
Declaring that the state is under the obligation to undertake measures which support 
the efforts the affected families have made to seek a better quality of life,200 the NTRC 
suggested a single pension, regardless of the harm suffered and the magnitude to which 
the victims‟ family members have been affected.201 The sole criterion was that „the name 
of the person who is the source of the right must appear on the list in the Report‟.202 This 
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 Created in the midst of a controversial debate, the Commission on Political imprisonment and Torture received 
35,000 testimonies out of 42,000 denounced detentions in a period of six months. Lira (n 164 above) 92.  
196
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261. 
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raised two observations. First, the NTRC suggested a formal equality with regard to all 
beneficiaries regardless of their socio-economic conditions and the causation link 
between these conditions and the damage suffered. This might have led to a situation 
where the impact of reparations places the beneficiaries in substantive inequalities, 
since their original situation was probably not the same. Second, unlike in South Africa, 
the set of reparations package is a right to the beneficiaries and a compelling duty upon 
the State.  This implies a possibility of claiming reparations before a court of law for 
secure an order that may give an appropriate compensation. This is true to the extent 
that the NCRR could send the information about the facts that appear to constitute an 
element of a crime to the ordinary courts.203 
 
3.3.4 Vertical versus horizontal reparations in Chile  
Unlike the South African case, the Chilean reparations process left an option for claiming 
reparations against individual perpetrators. But the nature of violations and the context 
make it clear that the main perpetrator of the violations was the State. Most of the time in 
fact, the violations involved an agent of the State either in official capacity or secretly to 
avoid tracing the fate of the victims.204 
Therefore, either claimed in civil or criminal litigation or through the administrative 
channel of pensions and other types of social benefits, reparations involve mainly a 
vertical relation between the Chilean state and the beneficiaries.  
 
3.3.5 Judicial versus non-judicial reparations  
In the Chilean reparations process, not only the different pensions are compatible with 
any other grant, but also none of the laws establishing the reparations programmes has 
explicitly stated any incompatibility between receiving the benefits and filing a civil 
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 Roht-Arriaza described that the context of repression in Americas was that ‘a large numbers of people were 
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lawsuit against the state, to seek reparations.205 Although the Chilean legislation allows 
for civil lawsuits, the Amnesty Law Decree 2.191 of 1978 and its restrictive interpretation 
by the Supreme Court were obstacles almost impossible to overcome.206 It was after the 
implementation of the legal reforms proposed by the NTRC that civil lawsuits were 
possible. Even though there were few civil lawsuits during the years 2002 and 2003,207 
they increased during the last months of 2002 due to the dismissal of the case against 
Pinochet and the fact that reparations awarded by lower courts were hundreds of times 
higher than the amounts of reparations pensions. In one case decided in 2002 in the 30th 
Civil Court in Santiago, for instance, Judge Ruben Palma Mejias ruled that the 
arguments of the statute of limitations or not to grant compensation because the 
claimant has received reparations pensions are unacceptable.208 However, the Fourth 
Chamber of the Supreme Court has upheld these arguments and set aside a lower 
court‟s ruling that ordered the payment of compensation.209 This was a dangerous 
precedent against the procedural aspect of the right to reparations, namely access to 
justice.  
Fortunately enough, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) has ruled 
that by obstructing the investigation and by preventing the victims and their next of kin 
from knowing the truth and receiving the corresponding reparations, Chile has violated 
the right to a fair trial and the right to judicial protection enshrined in the Convention and 
must ensure that Amnesty laws do not continue to hinder the investigation and 
prosecution of those responsible of violations in Chile.210 
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 Lira (n 164 above) 87. In the Americas, the IACtHR included,  the action has been individual or collective, what is 
referred to as ‘class action’. See J Garcia-Godos ‘Victim Reparations in the Peruvian Truth Commission and the 
Challenge of Historical Interpretation’ (2008) 2 The International Journal of Transitional Justice 66. 
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 The Supreme Court interpreted this Decree as preventing the judge to pursue an investigation. This interpretation 
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rev. in 156 (1997). 
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3.3.6 Positive and negative aspects of the Chilean reparations  
As a bad record, the Chile‟s economic reparations generated tensions and distortions in 
the communities.211 There was, in fact, a reluctance and doubt about the moral and 
psychological grounds of economic reparations and beneficiaries demanded that other 
forms of reparations contemplated by the NTRC report be implemented.  
Further, some insufficiencies of Law 19.123 were left uncorrected. For example, 
unmarried partners of the disappeared detainees and survivors of political executions 
were excluded from the list of beneficiaries. Moreover, some regarded the money 
received as a „privilege‟ and dissociated the benefits from their background and 
reparative perspective. 
On the other side, the question of accomplices and beneficiaries of the 
Pinochet‟s dictatorship has not been raised yet. Since some companies might have done 
business with Chile between 1973 and 1990, one might need to investigate how they 
were involved in or benefited from the violations.212 
 Despite this, many regarded the reparations programmes as successful, except 
for the search for disappeared detainees of which the 1 000 cases were still pending by 
the time NCRR came to terms.213 The majority of the beneficiaries also appreciated the 
economic reparations, although they demanded further recognition of harms they 
suffered as well as the vindication of the dignity and the good names of their families. 
The prominent features of the Chilean reparations remain, however, the follow-up 
mechanisms of Law 19.123. A continuous effort is sustained in assisting members of the 
victims‟ families,214 and conducting judicial and extra-judicial investigation to achieve the 
inalienable families‟ right to know the whereabouts the victims.215 The involvement of 
survivors in the programmes‟ design, coupled with the detailed character of the 
government reparatory projects,216 is also worth to be celebrated. 
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 As Desmond Tutu has said, this is one way of ensuring that in future, the international business companies will not 
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213
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3.4 Delivering reparations in Peru 
3.4.1 Context of transition 
During the last two decades of the twentieth century, Peru was in a bloody conflict 
marked by a fanatical insurgency which led to an armed conflict and a dictatorship 
established in the pretense of countering terrorism.217 The armed insurgence that 
triggered the conflict was led by two groups: the Maoist „Shining Path‟ or SL that began 
in 1980, and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement or MRTA, launched in 1984.218  
While the 1980s were marked by the highest record of disappearances and 
displacement, the 1990s saw a growing rate of unjust imprisonments and acts of torture 
under the draconian laws.219 The massive military response and the brutal actions of 
different groups involved in the conflict resulted in a state of emergency that was 
maintained by different administrations.220 It resulted in the bulk of 69 268 deaths 
between 1983 and 1993.221 In the meantime, elected in 1990, Alberto Fujimori 
suppressed the civil liberties as a response to the insurgence, perpetrated a self-coup in 
alliance with the Army by dissolving the National Congress and declaring the judiciary in 
reorganisation.222 To address the international concerns, he organised the elections that 
established a National Assembly with constitutional drafting powers. Adopted by 
referendum in 1993, the new Constitution gave strong powers to the President. Yet, the 
apparent normalisation did not translate into a respect for the rule of law. However, the 
leader of the SL capitulated after being captured in 1992,223  and the conflict was 
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essentially over after the destruction of a last active cell in 1997.224 Despite, erosion of 
political accountability, emergency measures, and abuses of powers by the intelligence 
services added to shadowy death squads and other crimes were the footprint of 
Fujimori‟s regime.225 As if it was not enough, the Peruvian government decided in 1999 
to withdraw from the jurisdiction of the IACtHR after an adverse decision condemned the 
anti-insurgent criminal framework.226 The issue became a source of criticism coming 
from the national opposition and international observers, worsening the already 
undermined government‟s image.227 A public video displaying a corruption scandal 
forced Fujumori to flee to Japan in 2000 and this pushed the regime to its collapse, 
offering to Peru an opportunity for transition.  
A truth and reconciliation commission (CVR) was created in 2001 and published 
its Final Report in August 2003. The Report recommended institutional reforms, criminal 
justice and a Plan for Integral Reparations (PIR).228 The latter contained reparations that 
included physical and mental healthcare, symbolic reparations, restitutions of rights, 
such as new identification cards, individual economic and non-economic reparations and 
collective reparations.229   
 
3.4.2 Peruvian CVR Report and the promises of reparations  
The PIR‟s overall objective was to repair and compensate victims of the conflict for the 
social, moral and material damage suffered.230 Specifically, it aimed at acknowledging 
the victimhood and re-establishing their civil rights while rebuilding the civic trust, 
contributing to the moral and physical recovery of victims and their relatives, and 
compensating economic and social damages.231 
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Additionally to this design,232 PIR extended the definition of victims as including 
not only those who suffered from the armed conflict but even the members of the 
guerillas groups – provided that the violation they suffered did not occur during the 
combat – and the armed forces.233 
The CVR distinguished between two types of beneficiaries: individuals and 
collectivities. Collective beneficiaries include peasant and native communities and 
settlements collectively affected by the armed conflict through the scorched-earth 
strategies, forced displacement, destruction of local institutions and loss of local private 
and public infrastructure, such as land, cattle and houses, community houses and 
community services.234 As a rule, the PIR excluded from reparations all those who might 
have received other forms of reparations from the State in order to avoid double 
reparations.235 Thus, the PIR recommended a repeal of the 1999 Reparations Decree, 
but said that those peasants who were receiving benefits under this Decree ought to be 
included as beneficiaries of the reparations plan.236 
One of the projects that received public attention is the Programme of Economic 
Reparations. According to the CVR, economic reparations symbolise an 
acknowledgment of the suffering and contribute to the initiation of a new social pact 
based on human rights and the rule of law.237 It also asserted that economic reparations 
show respect for the victim as individuals by providing them with opportunity to decide 
independently what their needs are for their subsistence and the social reproduction.238 
Like in the 1999 Reparations Decree, economic reparations were in the form of 
reparations or pension, including services targeting specific groups of victims and their 
relatives as described in the CVR report.239 But for some commentators, the PIR 
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advanced the cause of non-monetary reparations and did not go far enough concerning 
monetary reparations.240 The next section explores to what extent the legal and 
institutional framework reflects this assertion.  
 
3.4.3 Development of a normative framework: Delaying reparations is 
denying justice  
Amongst its objectives the Peruvian CVR‟s mandate included „making moral and 
material redress proposals‟.241 Although the CVR recommended comprehensive 
reparations with an inclusive definition of victims, the development of a legal framework 
was slower. Several months after the report was published, President Toledo promised 
only a programme of social development.242 This disappointed the victims who had high 
expectations of the CVR. 
 In 2004, the government formed a commission charged with developing a 
programme of reparations based on the PIR. In 2005, the Plan of Reparations 2005-
2006 was presented and approved by the Council of Ministers through an Executive 
Decree.243 However, the Plan was criticised for falling short of the ambitious reparations 
recommended in the PIR. In the midst of the debate, the government also issued in 2004 
an Executive Decree, urging various Ministries to begin developing reparations 
programmes.244  
 The adoption of Law 28.592 by the Congress in July 2005 was perceived as a 
triumph with regard to the making of reparations. But once again, NGOs and victim-
survivors were disillusioned by the lack of enthusiasm to translate the promises into 
reality.245 At stake, there were technical obstacles to implement the enacted legal 
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requirements, such as the compilation of a National Registry for all victims.246 Moreover, 
the development of a normative framework dissatisfied civil society organisations, as it 
relied on the personal commitment of individual ministers.247 This was aggravated by the 
Minister of Economy and Finance‟s reluctance to transfer funds for reparations, even 
when they were symbolic.248 The „there-are-no-funds‟ argument displayed an outright 
lack of political will and tolerated further impunity, while the same government approved 
huge budgets for the military and other politically popular causes.249 Beneficiaries had to 
await the appointment of a Reparations Council in October 2006,250 and the 
government‟s approval of the funding for collective reparations in 440 rural communities 
in March 2007.251  
In sum, the promises of reparations evolved from a legal right with a corresponding 
State‟s obligation elaborated in the PIR to a kind of political and moral State‟s 
prerogative with much more discretion. This made the victim-survivors‟ right to 
reparations hostage of the political will. Additionally, prosecutions as a form of justice for 
victims, and the reparations they may generate, has proved not to be an easy option in 
Peru despite the investigation strategy of and the cases handled to the Public 
Prosecutor by the CVR.252  
Further, the conception of justice by victims-survivors has become more restorative 
and reparative, insisting on delivering reparations.253 Therefore, victims‟ organisations 
have considered government‟s delays in to implement the PIR as a way of furthering 
impunity and denying justice to them.254 Fortunately, the implementation started with a 
renewed interest in the matter in 2005 by the President, but it proved to be long-
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lasting255 and challenging.256 Even though reparations in form of health and educational 
benefits began in 2009,257  the inclusion of the sole victims of rape as the sole category 
under the section of victims of sexual violence in the Registry proves to be controversial 
and exclusionary.258  
 
3.4.4 Vertical versus horizontal reparations and the question of judicial 
reparations in Peru 
The administrative reparations designed in the PIR and framed in Law 28.592 involve a 
state‟s obligation of funding and delivering the benefits. Victim-survivors could only claim 
them against the government.259 Consequently, collective reparations have been 
implemented in rural communities.260 
 However, the availability of vertical reparations does not exclude claims for 
reparations against non-state actors for their involvement in the violations, insofar as 
their responsibility can be established. The recent case of confidential settlement of 
paying compensation, reached between the English mining corporation, Monterrico 
Metals, and the victims of torture illustrates such an option of horizontal reparations.261  
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 Despite the numerous victims in Peru, only few of them received monetary and 
non-monetary reparations. This was mainly due to the IACtHR judgments that the 
transitional Government complied with to regain its legitimacy.262 Such actions were filed 
either as individual cases or class actions.263 In the Barrios Altos case, the IACtHR held 
that all measures designed to prevent the investigation and punishment of those 
responsible for human rights violations are inadmissible because they violate non-
derogable rights recognised by international human rights law.264 Further, the CVR‟s 
collation of evidences was to serve, among others, for criminal prosecutions against 
those responsible of heinous crimes.265 Therefore, the right to reparations affords victims 
an access-to-justice component that was not denied by the truth seeking process in 
Peru.266  
The prominent feature of reparations in Peru has so far been the collective 
reparations given to victim-survivors collectively affected by the conflict through 
displacement, loss of local or common infrastructures and community services. 267 They 
were, however, one of the programmes to be implemented by the Commission. 268 The 
name of the latter is illustrative of their importance: High-Level Multisectorial 
Commission for Design and Monitoring of a Policy of Peace, Collective Reparations and 
National Reconciliation (CMAN).269 Their merit is to go beyond the individual approach to 
victims and to look at the community or group-rights based perspective. This was 
acclaimed as more suitable for low-income societies where victims are the historically 
                                                                                                                                                                             
confidential settlement was reached under which victims received reparations payments. See the details of the case 
available at http://www.edcl.org/cases/corporate-accountability/peru-mining-opponents-tortured/ (accessed 21 July 
2011). 
262
 Laplante ‘From theory to practice’ (n 219 above) 81. 
263
 This was done after the transitional government led by Valentin Paniagua rejoined the IACtHR’s jurisdiction to 
reaffirm his commitment to the rule of law and respect for human rights. 
264
 Barrios Altos Chumbipuma Aguirre  et al. v Peru, Judgment of 14 March 2001. Series C No. 75, para 41. 
265
 The CVR developed a prosecutorial strategy and transmitted cases for criminal prosecutions at the end of which 
criminal damages or punitive reparations may be awarded to victims.   
266
 Through civil litigation, economic compensation can still be secured. Neither the CVR report nor the PIR Law have 
implicitly or explicitly reject this option. 
267
Garcia-Godos (n 205 above) 76. 
268
 Art 2(d), PIR Law. 
269
 Art 8, PIR Law (my emphasis). 
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poor groups, discriminated against on the ground of ethnicity, language and class. 270 
Collective reparations raise, however, concerns of ignoring individual autonomy and 
using patronised approach to the detriment of victims‟ agency and dignity. The challenge 
shows that an imperative room is still necessary for individualised reparations. 
  
3.4.5 Positive and negative aspects of reparations in Peru: The way 
forward 
The inclusive definition of victims and the comprehensive types of reparations adopted in 
the PIR could serve as a model likely to meet the expectations of victims. However, the 
implementation faced „logistical obstacles, political stalwarts and other idiosyncrasies 
which quickly disappointed victim-survivors.‟271  
The judicial avenues guarantee victims to satisfy their reparations claims. 
However, the State should not wait for a court order to make sound reparations, as it 
remains its legal obligation to provide remedy in case of violations of human rights. 
Although the liberal model of individual rights-approach remains relevant, the 
emphasis on collective reparations accommodates the specific context of rural victims. 
The CVR Report concluded that 75 percent of the victims are poor non-spanish 
speaking groups who live in rural areas.272 The damage they suffered the most was the 
loss of their community apparatus which facilitated their group-based way of life. 
Therefore, collective reparations seem suitable to satisfy their needs and to bring back to 
them hope and opportunity for a culturally adapted reconstruction. But the risk of 
confusing collective reparations and development projects adds to the set of questions 
raised by this approach, corroborating the assertion that collective as well as individual 
reparations should be complementary. 
Beyond the technical obstacles to the PIR, one of the serious criticisms 
formulated against the Peruvian model concerns the discriminatory implantation of Law 
28.534. It excluded certain category of victims, on the basis that they have participated 
in subversive activities.273 This exclusionary provision has been condemned as violating 
                                                          
270
 CVR, Final Report (2003) General Conclusion 5-7, quoted in Laplante & Theidon (n 222 above) 233. 
271
 Laplante ‘From theory to practice’ (n 219 above) 81. 
272
  CVR, Final Report (2003), General conclusion 5-7. 
273
 Art 2, PIR Law. 
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the foundational human rights principle of non-discrimination.274 Indeed, while the state 
may regard itself as addressing past violations, the current application of the „Clean 
Hands Doctrine‟ may result in new violations that will necessarily need to be addressed 
in the future.275 
Finally, the legislative or executive mode of creation of a truth-commission can also 
have an impact on the binding or non-binding nature of the recommendations contained 
in its report, including reparations. This was the case in Peru with regard to the PIR.276 
But as mentioned earlier, the political commitment to deliver reparations may solve this 
issue and many others. 
 
3.5    TJ without transition: Making reparations for victims of  ongoing 
armed conflicts in Colombia 
3.5.1 Context 
Colombia has been experiencing political violence from 1960s due to different armed 
movements both from the left-wing, mainly the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) established in 1964, the National Liberation Army (ELN) founded in 1964, and 
three others groups;277 and the right-wing self-defense groups called Paramilitaries that 
emerged late in 1970s. As a result, Colombia has the highest record of internally 
displaced persons in the world (IDPs).278 Other forms of victimisation include kidnapping, 
killings and disappearances, massacres, terrorist attacks, forced recruitment, sexual 
violence against women, etc.  
                                                          
274
 This was against the IACtHR’s jurisprudence which ordered reparations for victims convicted of participation in 
subversive movements. See Algería et al. v Peru, Judgment of 19 Septembern1996, Series No 29, 5. 
275
 For a discussion on the application of the ‘Clean Hands Doctrine’, i.e a victim should be granted reparations if he or 
she has not been involved in the violation in the past, in Peruvian reparations process, see Laplante ‘The law of 
remedies’ (n 219 above). 
276
 Laplante ‘From theory to practice’ (n 219 above) 82. 
277
 The M-19, a communist group; the indigenous group led by Quitin Lame and the Ejercito Popular Liberacion EPL. 
See, JG Orozco & M Goetz ‘Reparations for victims in Colombia: Colombia’s Law on Justice and Peace’ in Ferstman (n 
21 above) 436.  
278
 There were almost 4 million of IDPs in 2007. See http://www.internal-displacement.org (accessed 26 August 2011).    
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Previous efforts were made to end the conflict, some being more successful than 
others.279 In 1990s for instance, agreements were reached between the government and 
several guerilla groups such as the M-19, the EPL and the Quitin Lame. Members of 
these groups were demobilised and granted amnesties and they currently occupy 
influential political positions.280 More ambitious initiatives that started in 1998 to achieve 
peace failed, allegedly because of a lack of will from the FARC involved in drug-
trafficking activities.281 Although the Army was strengthened by the United States‟ anti-
narcotics assistance and the armed groups were put under pressure by the global „war 
against terrorism‟,282 the Government preferred to negotiate. The negotiations led to 
large-scale demobilisation of the Paramilitary groups by the end of 2002.283 However, 
some armed groups are still active and others in reconstitution,284 while the judiciary has 
embarked on a process of prosecuting the members of the self-defense paramilitary 
armed groups. Judicial and administrative reparations for victims are provided for within 
the new legal and institutional framework described in the following section.  
 The question is whether the current context of actively violent conflicts offers 
enough standards to qualify as a „transition‟ to democracy. Can TJ be designed where 
there is no political transition? Beside the fact that TJ is not just about political transition, 
it is important to make sure that the designed framework guarantees to victims‟ right to 
truth, justice and reparations as recognised under international law. Before thinking 
about TJ as mechanisms to respond to human rights violations committed in the past, 
                                                          
279
 The Uribe Accord was concluded in 1984 with FARC, but it couldn’t stop the conflict. See Orozco & Goetz (n 277 
above) 436. 
280
 As above, 437. 
281
 The Los Pozos Accord was signed with lots of concession to FARC, but the latter did not respect the terms of the 
agreement. It is estimated that 80% of the world’s cocaine is traded by the Colombian armed groups. 
282
 The Colombian conflict has been qualified as a war against drugs and drug-trafficking. More recently, it has also 
been described as part of the global ‘War on Terror’. See C Diaz ‘Colombia’s bid for justice and peace: lessons from 
negotiated justice, options in South Africa and Colombia’ (2007) Workshop 5, at 3. 
283
 National Reparation and Reconciliation Commission (NRRC), ‘Report to Congress 2007: Victims’ reparation process: 
Balance and future perspectives’ (2007) 120-121. 
284
 The emergence of a new armed group was reported by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2007 that 
there was new paramilitary organisation. See A/HRC/4/48 (5 March 2007). The same observations were made in 2006 
by the mission sent by the Organisation of American States (OAS) to support the peace process. See OEA/Ser.G 
CP/doc.4148/06. 
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the violence must stop. Otherwise, it is difficult to know from what to what the society in 
transiting. Either the response is anything but TJ, or the latter is to be redefined not as a 
retrospective mechanism but as a response for present-day or future violations.285   
 
3.5.2 Legal and institutional framework for reparations 
While the members of the self-defence groups who are not responsible for serious 
crimes have been subject to favourable conditions and received benefits prescribed in 
Law 782 of 2002 and Decree 128 of 2003,286 the high-level perpetrators were excluded 
from the reintegration process and had to face prosecutions. The benefits could be lost if 
the beneficiaries were later found to have committed human rights violations, and be 
submitted to the conditions prescribed in Law 975/2005 on Justice and Peace.287 
Law 975/2005 was passed in 2005 after two years of national and international 
debate about the amnesty-like conditions that further stability and accountability that 
promote victims‟ rights within internationally accepted standards.288  Designed to fill the 
gaps of Law 782, Law 975/2005 contains two parts. The first refers to judicial 
investigations and „alternative punishment‟ to those of the armed groups who confess 
their crime, including availing reparations for victims. The second part details the victims‟ 
rights to truth, justice and reparations.289 Law 975/2005 was challenged before the 
Constitutional Court which upheld its validity in 2006, while making it stricter in its 
application to perpetrators and wider with regard to victims‟ rights. It is interesting to 
notice that Colombia‟s transitional efforts are essentially based on judicial processes, 
conducted in a context of unsuccessful mutual offers between the government and the 
FARC on the topics of negotiations, including reparations for victims.290  
                                                          
285
 Layus makes this point by arguing that transitional justice is not inseparable with political transition, as change to 
democratic regime does not necessarily goes with establishing transitional justice mechanisms. See RF Layus The role 
of transitional justice in the midst of ongoing armed conflicts: The case of Colombia (2010) 91. 
286
 The majority of paramilitary members were pardoned from criminal prosecutions. They went through a 
reintegration process after having been demobilised and received social and economic benefits.  Orozco & Goetz (n 
277 above) 438. 
287
 As above. 
288
 Law 975/2005 adopted by the Congress on 25 July 2005. 
289
 As above, quoted in Orozco & Goetz (n 277 above) 440. 
290
 Diaz (n 282 above) 1. 
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The Constitutional Court has stated that perpetrators have to be held 
accountable and to ensure a just payment of reparations, their legally and illegally 
acquired assets should be availed.291 The Court added that economic reparations are an 
element of the right to reparations of victims and a condition to fight against impunity.292 
While it widened the definition of the term „victim‟ and aligned its scope with international 
criteria,293 the Court held that victims must fulfill probative requirements that they have 
suffered concrete and specific harm before their rights be validated.294 Fortunately, 
despite the limiting wording of the law, the Court added that „no budgetary constraint 
might be used as an argument to excuse the state from compensating the victims.‟295 
The victims‟ right to reparations was furthered by the Court‟s ruling that there is also a 
collective obligation of solidarity among perpetrators.296 
 Law 975/2005 also established a National Reparations and Reconciliation 
Commission (CNNR) as a consulting, assisting and monitoring body to guarantee 
victims‟ rights and promote reconciliation.297 As it stands, the CNNR should not be 
confused with a truth commission.298 Its mandate was to guarantee victims‟ participation 
in proceedings of judicial clarification, to recommend criteria for reparations,299 including 
                                                          
291
 Colombian Constitutional Court [18 May 2006] Sentencia C-370/2006, Expediente D-6032, para 6.2.4.1. 11. 
292
 Constitutional Court Judgment, para 6.2.4.1.12. 
293
 The Court quoted the jurisprudence of the IACtHR in the cases of 19 Tradesmen v Colombia, Judgment of 5 July 
2004, Series C No. 109 and the case of Myrna Mack Chang v Guatemala, Judgment of 25 November 2003, Series C No. 
101. 
294
 This will complicate the process through which victims have to go, since most of them ignore exactly which of the 
several armed groups forced them to flee. 
295
 Constitutional Court Judgment, para 6.2.4.3.3.2. 
296
 Constitutional Court Judgment quoted in Orozco & Goetz (n 277 above) 447, where it stated that all members of 
the perpetrator’s group, including the group itself,  are liable to pay reparations if the assets of the convicted 
perpetrator are not sufficient for the purpose of full reparations to be granted to the victim. 
297
 Art 51 of Law 975/2005. 
298
 Colombia went for a judicial truth, unlike other countries which established quasi-judicial and political bodies – 
Truth Commissions and the historical truth recorded by the CNRR should complement the judicial truth established by 
the judiciary. See LJ Laplante & K Theidon ‘Transitional justice in times of conflict: Colombia’s Ley de Justicia y Paz 
(2006) 28 Michigan Journal of International Law 49 quoted  Orozco & Goetz (n 277 above) 446. 
299
 The criteria would also assist judges to fix judicial reparations. See Orozco & Goetz (n 277 above) 455. 
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the implementation of an institutional collective programme. It was also to report on 
reparations within two years.300 
 The CNNR established two reparations programmes, namely the National and 
the Institutional Reparations Programmes. The latter was designed to respond in the 
short-term to the psychological-care needs and other urgent services of specific groups 
of victims such as children, women, indigenous people and afro-Colombians.301 
 As the proceedings are slow, judicial reparations are not to be recovered in the 
short-term and the government felt a duty to pass Decree 129 in April 2008, creating 
Administrative Reparations Programme (ARP) to be implemented in August 2008 
without any judicial proceeding.302 Its slow implementation303 does not display the 
government‟s commitment to restore victims in the political community with equality and 
respect.304 The ARP was conceived as a complement to the judicial reparations to be 
funded by the paramilitaries‟ recovered assets, and was to consider only monetary 
reparations and the possibility of land restitutions.305  
In June 2011, Law 1448 was passed by the Congress to establish judicial, 
administrative, social, individual and collective economic benefits for victims. While Law 
1448 makes clear reference to TJ in many provisions,306 its ambitious promises to 
compensate victims still need to be seen in practice, since the different initiatives have 
been so far slow and inefficient.307  
3.5.3 Horizontal versus vertical reparations: Judicial reparations 
complemented by administrative programmes 
The outset judicial perspective of reparations in Colombia may be justified by the 
peculiarity of the Colombian conflict. On one hand, the political system seems to be 
                                                          
300
 NCRR was charged to administer assets collected from the members of the demobilised armed groups, legally or 
illegally obtained. 
301
 Orozco & Goetz (n 277 above) 455. 
302
 Layus (n 285 above) 87. 
303
 As of May 2009, it had not started to be implemented. Layus, as above. 
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 De Greiff 2008: 464, quoted in Layus (n 285 above) 88. 
305
 Layus (n 285 above)  87. 
306
 Arts 1, 8 & 9, Law 1448; defining transitional justice as mechanisms to bring perpetrators to satisfy victims’ right to 
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democratic, with a strong and activist judiciary. On the other, perpetrators have acquired 
huge fortunes because of the drug-trafficking activities and the land acquisitions 
inseparable with the conflict.308 In this context, the Constitutional Court rightly found it309  
[D]isproportionate to renounce pursuit of the patrimony of those responsible for serious 
injury, particularly where it can be shown that those responsible have amassed immense 
fortunes and those who have been victimised have been uprooted and live in painful 
conditions of poverty.  
Law 975/2005 intends to facilitate the reconciliation process through judicial proceedings 
where victims prove the specific harm suffered and perpetrators confess their crimes 
and avail their assets for victim‟s reparations, before they are granted an alternative 
punishment which varies from five to eight years.310 This horizontal relationship between 
perpetrators and victims with regard to reparations has to be mediated by the judiciary 
whose capacity has been strengthened to deal with massive cases and protect victims, 
while ensuring their participation.311  
Moreover, the right and the corresponding duty to make reparations are not 
strictly limited to the horizontal relation between the victim and the perpetrator. Not only 
the Constitutional Court established a joint liability among members of the same group 
but also the government established later in 2008 an ARP which was designed to be 
state-funded and complement the judicial reparations. Despite delayed implementation, 
the ARP illustrates a vertical obligation so binding upon the state that „no budgetary 
constraint might be used as an argument to excuse the state from repairing the 
victims‟.312 
The new Law 1448 maintains judicial and administrative reparations, confirming 
the complementary relation between horizontal or perpetrators-funded and vertical or 
state-run reparations. At the time of writing, its implementation has not started.  
                                                          
308
 This justifies partially the complexity of the Colombian conflict and unwillingness of the armed groups to join the 
peace and demobilisation process. 
309
 The Constitutional Court judgment, para 6.2.4.1. 11. 
310
 Arts 30&31, Law 975/2005. 
311
 20 prosecutors have been appointed and hearings are held in different regions to collect victims’ testimonies. 
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 This makes the state duty as compelling as the perpetrators’ obligation to make reparations. See n 291 above. 
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3.5.4 Strengths and weakness of the Colombian reparations framework 
The conflicts between the government and the FARC and other movements undermine 
TJ efforts, since the solutions are not only directed to past violations but to present ones, 
and perhaps future abuses. In such a setting, it is almost impossible to design and 
implement comprehensive reparations. 
Notwithstanding possible gaps in the implementation, the existing framework 
presents some positive aspects. First, victims have been placed at the centre of the 
debate and the legal and policy measures highlight their procedural and substantive right 
to justice, truth and reparations.313 This may be justified by the international 
organisations and the civil society‟s inputs in the debate on TJ, which guaranteed 
international standards.314 Secondly, the combination of judicial and administrative 
reparations is likely to provide appropriate reparations to victims, whose quantum of 
benefits may be decided according to objective criteria, systematically submitted to a 
judicial review.315 The contribution of perpetrators in the funding of reparations is likely to 
further moral satisfaction to victims. Third, the parallel run of reparations and criminal 
liability through judicial proceedings is likely to meet the victims‟ demand for reparative 
and retributive justice, while maintaining the reparative effect of the benefits.316 
 On the other side, the reparations framework presents some shortcomings. First, 
the probative conditions required to victims before validating their rights limit the 
likelihood of making comprehensive reparations for victims who do not and could not 
know the identity of the perpetrators. This is worsened by the state of ongoing violations 
which threaten the victims and hinder their readiness to testify. Second, the use of the 
judiciary to tackle leaders of armed groups and secure horizontal reparations may be 
                                                          
313
 From Law 975/2005 to Law 1448/2011, including in the implementing decrees, the principles of accountability and 
reparations are underscored. The procedural aspect is mainly illustrated by their meaningful participation and 
involvement in the designing and implementation of reparations.  
314
 The UN-OHCHR sent observations during the debate on the amendment of Law 975/2005, OAS has its permanent 
support mission and the IACtHR has ruled on the demobilization process and TJ in Colombia.  
315
 The criteria of reparations that are to be determined by the CNNR serve as guidance to judges who are free to fixe 
reparations they deem appropriate to provide as ‘integral reparations’ as possible.  
316
 In many processes where reparations programmes are implemented separately, concerns have arisen about their 
link and other measures of justice. See P De Greiff ‘Justice and Reparations’ in De Greiff (n 11 above) 455-461.   
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perceived as manipulation of the courts system which might be further mistrusted during 
future negotiations, as having taken part to the conflict against one party. Thirdly, 
although the laws and policy seem to be pro-victims‟ on paper, their implementation is 
slow and is facing hard obstacles, with less participation of victims. 
In conclusion, this chapter has provided an overview of the application of the 
right to reparations in four countries. Although the challenges, strengths and 
weaknesses are explained by specific local contexts of transition, there are lessons 
which can guide the design and the implementation of reparations schemes in the future. 
Burundi has embarked on a debate on the way TJ mechanisms should look like. The 
following chapter assesses the extent to which the Burundian TJ model in making can 
learn from the above-discussed experiences. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
NEGOTIATING REPARATIONS IN BURUNDIAN TRANSITION: 
LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA AND THE AMERICAS 
4.1 Historical background and the question of TJ 
Burundi has been in a cycle of inter-ethnic violence since its independence in 1962.317 
After the assassination of Prince Louis Rwagasore, leader of the independence party – 
Union for the National Progress (UPRONA), a crisis exploded within the party‟s 
leadership about the succession.318 It evolved along ethnic lines319 due to the inter-ethnic 
rivalries inherited from the Belgian colonisers.320 Hutu and Tutsi have been in violent 
confrontation almost every decade. Starting from 1965, when civilians of both ethnic 
groups were killed subsequent to the assassination of the Hutu Prime Minister Pierre 
Ngendandumwe,321 genocidal massacres allegedly took place particularly in 1972322 and 
1993.323 In the meantime, massive killings were reported in 1988324 and 1991.325  
                                                          
317
 R Schweiger ‘Late justice for Burundi’ (2006) 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 653. 
318
 R Lemarchand Burundi: Ethnic conflict and genocide (1994), quoted in JT Hottinger ‘Burundi: The causes of the 
conflict and its development’ (2008) 2 available at 
http://www.bmlv.gov.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/09_fij_08_bbc.pdf (accessed 31 August 2011). 
319
 Burundian conflict has evolved on all grounds – ethnic, political and regional – despite the fact that the Arusha 
Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (APRA) qualified it as an essentially political conflict with serious ethnic 
dimensions. Protocol I, art 4(a) of the APRA. 
320
 Like the conflict between Flemish and francophone communities in Belgium, the Belgian colonisers systematically 
implemented inter-ethnic exclusionary policies (under the indirect rule) in favour of the Batutsi (minority) against the 
Bahutu (majority). There exists a small minority of Batwa but they have not played a key role in the history of the 
Burundian conflict.  
321
 Despite the victory of Bahutu in the 1965 legislative elections, the Mwami did not appoint Hutu Prime Minister to 
take over Pierre Ngendandumwe. Subsequently, an attempt of the Hutu-dominated ‘Gendarmerie’ to seize power in 
October 1965 led to an extremely violent repression by the army: virtually, the entire Hutu political elite was 
massacred, thousands of rurally based Hutu suspected of having supported the revolt. See Hottinger (n 318 above) 2. 
322
 In reaction to a Hutu insurgency movement from the South that resulted in an estimated killing of 3 000 Tutsi, the 
Tutsi-dominated army killed around 10 000 - 20 000 Hutu from April to November 1972, forced many others to flee 
and expropriated their lands and other properties. See R Lemarchand ‘Genocide in the Great Lakes: Which genocide? 
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Moreover, Burundi was under a military and one-party rule since 1966 until the 
first pluralist elections held in June 1993.326 The killings of Tutsi that started in 1993327 
and the subsequent massacres of Hutu by the army led to the emergence of active pro-
Hutu armed movements around 1994 - 1995.328 In 1998, political negotiations started 
under the mediation of Julius Kambarage Nyerere, President of Tanzania and continued 
by Nelson Mandela, then President of South Africa. They resulted in the 2000 Arusha 
Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (APRA) which gives an account of the history of 
the Burundian conflict.329 Unfortunately, the main armed groups were not part of the 
negotiations and joined the process only later. In 2002 - 2003, the Global Ceasefire 
Agreement (GCA) was signed between the transitional Government and the National 
Council for the Defense of Democracy-Front for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-
FDD), including some other small armed groups.330 The transition officially ended with 
the 2005 elections which were won by the CNDD-FDD, which had become a political 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Whose genocide?’ (1998) 41 African Studies Review 6; R Lemarchand ‘Selective genocide in Burundi’, London, 
Minority Rights Group, Report No. 20, July 1974 quoted in Hottinger (n 318 above) 2. 
323
 UN Security Council, S/1996/682, 22 August 1996. 
324
 These killings targeted Tutsi who were suspected of witchcraft in Ntega and Marangara. The army responded by 
killing around 20 000 Hutus and 60 000 fled to Rwanda. See in general, JP Chretien et al. La crise d’août 1988 au 
Burundi (1989); Amnesty International ‘Burundi: killings of children by government troops’ (1988). 
325
 These killings illustrated inter-ethnic rivalries, hidden in arbitrary accusations of witchcraft. The five periods, 1965-
1973-1988-1991-1993, were recommended by the Kalomoh Report to be the main focus of the TJ mechanisms in 
Burundi. See Kalomoh Report, S/2005/158, para 11. 
326
 After Micombero overthrew the monarchy in 1966 and proclaimed the Republic, other military coups were 
perpetrated by Jean Baptiste Bagaza in 1977, and Pierre Buyoya in 1987. All concentrated the executive, the 
legislative and the judiciary under the control of the single state-party, UPRONA.  
327
 By August 1994, already 50 000 Tutsi and Hutu non-FRODEBU supporters were killed. See Report of the Security 
Council Mission to Burundi on 13 and 14 August 1994, S/1994/1039, para 7. 
328
 There have been some Hutu armed groups starting from 1965 (Movement for the Liberation of Bahutu – MOLIBA) 
and 1980s (Party for the Liberation of Hutu People- PALIPEHUTU and Front for National Liberation), but they were not 
considered as serious threats by successive military regimes. Hottinger (n 318 above) 3. 
329
 The APRA is still the reference in Burundian legislation. 
330
 The APRA was then complemented and recognised by the GCA between the transitional government and the 
former rebel movement CNDD-FDD, and the Pretoria Protocol thereto on Political, Defense and Security Power 
Sharing in Burundi of 8 October 2003.  
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party.331 However, there was still an active armed group which negotiated and signed the 
Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement (CCA) in 2006.332 During this long-standing 
conflict in which gross and systematic violations of human rights resulted in more than 
500,000 victims,333 the victimisation took many forms: killings and assassinations, sexual 
assaults and other forms of violence against women, farms devastation and house 
destruction, expropriation without indemnification, robbery, summary executions and 
judicial trials without due processes, arbitrary detentions, forced exiles, internal 
displacement, torture, forced disappearances, destruction of private and public 
infrastructures, etc.334  
Although the international community showed its concerns and the need for a 
judicial inquiry after the 1993 events by sending preparatory and fact-finding missions,335 
the question of TJ was really debated during and included in the APRA.336 However, 
these provisions were not implemented until the promulgation of Law on TRC in 2004.337 
                                                          
331
 Some argue that there has been no transition because in 2005 there was still an active armed group (FNL). The 
same comments are formulated with regard to the withdrawal of several political parties, gathered together in the 
Alliance for Democratic Change ADC-IKIBIRI, from the 2010 elections and an alleged emergence of new armed groups.  
332
 The FNL was the first-born armed group and the last to sign a peace agreement on 7 December 2006. The three 
political documents (APRA, GCA and CCA) serve until now as the reference of the historical Burundian transition from 
authoritarianism and armed conflict to [negative] peace. 
333
 These are mere estimations since there is no official statistics of the victims. 
334
 See for details, the Report of National Consultations on the Implementation of TJ in Burundi (2010) 54. 
335
 See the UN Report of the preparatory fact-findings mission; the 1995 ‘Ake Huslid’ Report S/1995/157; the 1995 
‘Nikken’ Report, S/1995/631; and the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Burundi, S/1996/682. The 
lack of follow-up to the recommendations of these commissions was criticised in the Kalomoh Report which warned 
for the effect of such inaction on the UN legitimacy and credibility to promote justice and the rule of law in Burundi. 
See Kalomoh Report, Doc./UN/S/2005/158, para 72. 
336
 Arts 6-8 of Protocol I of the APRA. 
337
 Previous ‘constitutions’ provided for an establishment of an international commission of inquiry to investigate and 
qualify the crimes committed in Burundi. These include the 1994 so-called ‘Convention of Government’ which stated 
that ‘… 30 days after the appointment of the cabinet, a Commission of International Judicial Inquiry shall be 
established…’ (art 36 of the Convention of Government) ; the 2001 Interim Constitution of Burundi, Law No. 1/017 
which required the Interim Government  ‘… to request *the UN+ the creation of an International Commission of 
Inquiry and, eventually, the establishment of an International Criminal Tribunal…’ (Art 288 of the 2001 Interim 
Constitution). 
 
 
 
 
60 
 
This law was criticised and never implemented because of the lack of consultation and 
inclusive participation prior to its enactment.  
The real TJ initiatives started in 2004 with the UN mission which was requested 
by the Government of Burundi and dispatched to assess the feasibility of establishing an 
international judicial commission of inquiry, as provided for in the 2000 APRA.338 The 
assessment mission produced a report which suggested the creation of a truth 
commission, and a special court chamber within the Burundian judiciary system.339 
Adopted by the UN Security Council, the Kalomoh Report still serves as the basis of the 
TJ debate in Burundi.340  
 
4.2 Negotiating TJ in a changing and fragile political context 
The APRA was concluded under the regime of Pierre Buyoya, who came back to power 
after the 1996 coup d‟état.341 Article 8 of Protocol I to the APRA provided for the 
establishment of a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), with three 
functions: investigation, arbitration and reconciliation, and clarification of the history.  
First, the Commission was required to establish the truth regarding the serious 
acts of violence committed from 1 July 1962 until 28 August 2000. It had also to classify 
the crimes, establish the responsibilities, as well as the identity of the perpetrators and 
victims. But quite clearly, the Commission had limitations: it would lack the powers to 
classify acts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.342 Interestingly, the 
TRC conceived by the APRA was not authorised to grant amnesties, although the 
transitional National Assembly might have done so for politically motivated crimes, had it 
or had the TRC found it appropriate.343 
Secondly, upon completion of its investigations, the Commission must 
recommend measures aimed at promoting reconciliation and forgiveness. They include 
                                                          
338
 Dispatched at the UN Security Council request (UN Doc. S/2004/72 of 26 January 2004), the mission submitted its 
report – the Kalomoh Report – on 11 March 2005 (UN Doc. S/2005/158). 
339
 The Kalomoh Report, para 53. 
340
 UN Security Council Resolution 1606/2005. 
341
 The 1996 coup d’etat raised an international condemnation and pressure by imposing an embargo which pushed 
President Buyoya to the table of negotiations that officially started in 1998. See AD Olinga ‘The embargo against 
Burundi before the African Commission’ (2005) 5 African Human Rights Law Journal 425-426. 
342
 Art 8 para 1(a) of Protocol I of APRA. 
343
 As above, para 1(b). 
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ordering restitution of disputed properties or deciding just indemnifications, or other 
measures deemed appropriate.344 Thus, the right to reparations was envisaged within 
this framework. 
 These provisions were not implemented, as the conflict continued and that the 
stakeholders were reluctant to criminal prosecutions against the incumbent elite who 
might resist judicial accountability, be it by violent means. As far as TJ is concerned, only 
provisions related to the release of political prisoners and the granting of temporary 
immunity or amnesties attracted much attention, as they were underscored in the 
Ceasefire Agreements.345  
The TJ provisions were not incorporated into the APRA in response to a strong 
domestic demand.346 The factors that motivated the incorporation of TJ provisions in the 
APRA are attributable to political calculations of negotiating parties.347 Pro-Tutsi parties 
insisted on the need for TJ mechanisms before elections; the idea being that their Hutu 
challengers would be disqualified from an election contest because of having to face 
criminal charges for gross human rights violations committed in the past. For Hutus, who 
expected to gain from the election, TJ offered protection against possible 
prosecutions.348 Later on, it was viewed as a political tool to use against one‟s rivals. 
Thus, although it was required by the Interim Constitution, one can understand 
why the request for the dispatching of the international commission of inquiry was sent in 
July 2002 to the UN Security Council under President Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi from 
UPRONA. Equally, for implementing the TJ provisions, the unsuccessful Law on TRC 
was enacted under the second period of transition led by President Domitien Ndayize, a 
Hutu from FRODEBU. It is also during his regime that the UN mission was dispatched 
and the Kalomoh Report‟s recommendations adopted.349 The Security Council requested 
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 As above, art 8 para 1(b).  
345
 Several commissions were established to deal with the question of political prisoners and the majority of those 
prisoners had been released by the year 2006. Equally, the granting of ‘provisional immunity against prosecutions for 
politically motivated crimes’ was implemented in November 2003. Provisional immunity was granted to political 
leaders returning from exile. See S. Vandengiste ‘Transitional justice for Burundi: A long and winding road’ (2007) 
Workshop report, 16-20.   
346
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 See the UN Security Council Resolution 1606/2005. 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
the Secretary-General to „initiate negotiations with the government and consultations 
with all Burundian parties concerned on how to implement its recommendations.‟350 
Although the Kalomoh Report respected the spirit of the 2000 APRA, it is a new basis 
that took into account local and international developments that had taken place 
between 2000 and 2005.351 Among new developments in Burundi features the decrease 
of ethnic rivalry in political debate, as compared to the 1993 elections. However, for the 
majority of the Burundians, legitimacy still depends on ethnic representation.352 Also, the 
horrors of genocidal killings have altered the image that one group has of the other, to 
the extent that the notion of collective guilt remains the principal obstacle to national 
reconciliation.353  
 The rounds of the TJ negotiations started in March 2006 and March 2007 after a 
shift of the balance of power,354 and under the new CNDD-FDD regime which expressed 
reluctance to a judicial mechanism.355 The fact that the negotiations are conducted with 
a regime dominated by members of former armed movements involved in violations 
justifies the current state of affairs. Blockades and failures characterised these 
negotiations.356 But parties agreed on few issues, including the establishment of both 
                                                          
350
 UN Security Council, Resolution 1606, Operative para 1. 
351
 S Vandengiste Stones left unturned: Law and Transitional Justice in Burundi (2010) 199. 
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 J Nimubona ‘La perception de l’identité ethnique dans le processus électoral au Burundi’ (2005) Bujumura, LDGL, 
quoted in S Vandengiste ‘Power sharing as a fragile safety valve in times of electoral turmoil: The costs and benefits of 
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 Lemarchand ‘Genocide in the Great Lakes’ (n 322 above) 5&11. The ethnic rivalry has engendered mutual 
accusation between Hutu and Tutsi, each seeing the other as responsible of what happened, and each denying to 
recognise the other’s sufferings. 
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 The 2005 elections were won by the former rebel movement CNDD-FDD. But the transition was based on a 
political compromise between new and old elites in a form of consociational power-sharing. International standards 
in the TJ debate are promoted by a national and international civil society supported by the UN.  
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 The CNDD-FDD Government stated that justice will intervene only if the pardon turns out to be impossible. See 
Communiqué du Gouvernement sur le Conseil des Ministres du 02 Février 2006, Bujumbura (2006) 1. 
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 Two rounds of negotiations were conducted in 2006 and 2007. The second failed as the two negotiating parties 
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High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour. See UN Security Council, ‘First report of the Secretary-General 
on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi’ S/2007/287, 17 May 2007, para 79. 
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mechanisms in two phases and the organisation of national consultations (NC) before 
further negotiations.357  
To make the process transparent and participatory, national consultations (NC) 
were conducted.358 Negotiating parties agreed not to raise outstanding questions during 
the NC which were chaired by representatives of the government, the civil society and 
the UN.359 The NC were sanctioned by a report and recommendations submitted to the 
President.360 Further negotiations will be pursued under the CNDD-FDD second term, an 
almost single-party regime that resulted from the 2010 elections.361 This will have an 
impact on the balance of power and the outcome of the next negotiations. 
 
4.3 Reparations in the Burundian TJ debate 
The APRA‟s negotiators were not much concerned with the issue of reparations. 
However, Protocol IV required the government to study the modalities of compensating 
the returnees for properties left in the exile.362 The same Protocol deals with principles of 
restitution of land and other properties to „survivors‟ of the conflict, with a special 
attention to refugees.363 If restitution proves to be impossible, each beneficiary must be 
                                                          
357
 Framework Agreement between the Government of Burundi and the UN on the creation and definition of the 
mandate of the Steering Committee in charge of national consultations on TJ in Burundi, signed on 2 November 2007 
(Accord-Cadre entre le Gouvernement de la République du Burundi et l’Organisation des Nations Unies portant 
création et définition du mandat du Comité de Pilotage Tripartite en Charge des Consultations Nationales sur la 
Justice de Transition au Burundi). 
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 S/2005/158, para 75. 
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 Para 10 of the General Framework signed between the Government and the UN on 2 November 2007. The 
outstanding questions concern the issue of amnesties, the relationship between the TRC and the Special Tribunal and 
the independence of the Prosecutor. 
360
 The report was finalised and submitted to the President in April 2010. Its public released was delayed until 
December 2010, due to the elections that took place from May to September 2010. 
361
 The 2010 were contested by most the opposition parties, even though judged free and fair by the international 
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 Art 5(c), Protocol IV, APRA. 
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indemnified equitably.364 Refugees who could not return may receive an equitable 
indemnification if they had been victim of land expropriation without compensation.365 
Other provisions concerned symbolic reparations, for example erecting memorial 
monuments for all victims, identifying mass graves for the purpose of dignified burial and 
marking a national day of remembrance.366   
Thus, the APRA reparations concerned limited losses and selected category of 
victims. For historical and cultural reasons, the land recovery and compensation 
attracted the attention of the negotiators. The prescribed National Commission for 
Rehabilitation of Victim-survivors (CNRS) was established by the transitional 
government in 2002 with members from different ethnic groups and political affiliation.367 
Its mandate was to help returnees to recover their lands or to be compensated.368 The 
CNRS ceased to exist at the end of the transitional period,369 and was taken over by the 
current National Commission on Land and Other Goods (CNTB). Established in 2006, its 
function is to settle land disputes and to assist returnees to recover their lands and other 
properties.370  
A progressive interpretation of the APRA‟s acknowledgment of victims of 
violence, and the general reference to international instruments may allow for an 
inference to be made to the right to reparations. Protocol III related to peace and security 
recognised as victims, Hutu and Tutsi alike.371 The same Protocol further lists the state‟s 
duties to protect all fundamental rights, including all those recognised in the Universal 
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Declaration and all human rights instruments ratified by Burundi.372 The GCA and the 
CCA did not refer anyhow to victims‟ right to reparations. 
Although the APRA may broadly be considered a legal basis for victims‟ rights, 
reparations were, arguably, left out by the negotiators. First, the parties were concerned 
with stopping political and military violence and they sought for an agreement that would 
allow Hutu-Tutsi coexistence, rather than making reparations to victims. For this reason, 
the APRA and the subsequent ceasefire agreements focused on power sharing and 
guarantees of no prosecutions for „politically motivated‟ crimes.373 
Secondly, the negotiators erred in viewing reconciliation as pacification among 
political elites, leaving behind the communities on the grounds that have been seriously 
affected by decades of unfinished violence. By so doing, they missed an opportunity of 
conceiving a long-term plan for future reconciliation at micro and community levels.374 
This would have necessarily led to a debate around TJ reparations. 
Thirdly as stated earlier, the entire issue of TJ was not a locally-driven demand 
and fascinated negotiators for political speculations.375 Moreover, the fact that South 
Africa played the role of mediation may have had a contaminating effect, offering an 
opportunity to „export‟ the South African model. The fascination that the governmental 
delegation and the CNDD-FDD memorandum displayed to the South African „model‟376 
coupled with the growing close relationship between the CNDD-FDD and the ANC 
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regimes may corroborate this claim.377 But is it appropriate for Burundi to frame its 
transition the South African way?378 
On the other side, the Kalomoh Report did not tackle the issue of reparations, 
despite the growing attention of contemporary international practice on the victims‟ 
rights.379 However, reparations were one of the issues on which participants in the NC 
expressed their views. The NC Report states that participants expressed their 
preference more for collective and symbolic reparations,380 rather than individual 
material grants.381 Interestingly, the questions asked to participants with regard to 
reparations were only limited to these three categories,382 which restricted the choice of 
the participants.  
At the time of writing, the government created a technical committee to work on 
methodological issues related to the creation of the TRC, including the amendment of 
the 2004 Law on TRC, the proposals of appointment criteria for the Commissioners and 
the budget of the TRC.383  The Committee does not include a member of the civil society 
and has a three-month term.384 It requested an additional time to complete its 
mandate.385 Definitely, the recommendations will only guide the negotiators and relevant 
reparations policy will probably be formulated by the forthcoming TRC. At that stage, 
time will be ripe to look deeper into the experiences from abroad, including the above-
discussed cases for the design of comprehensive reparations schemes. 
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 Five contracts on mining contracts were signed between South Africa and Burundi. See IWACU ‘Le Burundi et 
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4.4 Designing reparations within TJ in making in Burundi: Learning from 
other experiences  
Each of the cases studied earlier provides for insightful lessons for the making of TJ in 
Burundi, despite the fact that local needs always suggest to eschew the one-fits-all 
solution.386 Therefore, the peculiar feature of Burundian context such as a fragile and 
unstable transition, the nature of victimisation, the collective guilt and mutual 
accusations, the long-standing culture of impunity, the control of power by members of 
former rebels groups and influential positions of the former military commanders, the 
possible emergence of new armed groups, the weak political institutions and the 
manipulated judiciary,387 the governance shortage and endemic corruption388 should be 
kept in mind. 
 The South African experience is less attractive with regard to the procedural 
aspect of reparations. Its lack of inclusive participation of victims with regard to the 
debate on reparations, coupled with the provisions of the TRC Act denying the access-
to-justice component of reparations should be avoided by Burundian stakeholders. The 
provisions of the APRA excluding amnesties and the recent NC allow for hope, although 
the current CNDD-FDD regime stated that judicial accountability should only be 
undertaken if the TRC reconciliation and forgiveness process fail.389 
 On the other side, the South African experience may suggest positive insights on 
the importance of individual financial grants, as a form of recognising victims‟ autonomy 
and to give them agency to decide what to do with reparations benefits. The interim 
reparations are also a suitable approach to deal with victims in urgent need. However, 
the criticism of changing a six-year period recommended by the TRC in a one-time 
payment should serve as a negative experience. 
 The Chilean case is rich of lessons. First, the permanent character of the 
reparations pension has a potential to empower and reincorporate victims as worth 
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citizens in the new community. Equally, the continuous design of reparations updates 
the meaningfulness of the benefits. The same practice may guide the Burundians with 
regard to reparations delivery. 
 Secondly, for different violations different programmes of reparations were 
undertaken without any incompatibility between different grants, including possible 
judicial compensation. As the conflict brought different forms of victimisation in Burundi, 
the diversification of reparations programmes is highly commendable. 
 Thirdly, victims of 40 years of conflicts may not be comprehensively identified 
within the limited period of TJ mechanisms.390 Therefore, follow-up programmes should 
be envisaged at the outset and the list of victims kept open, in order to avoid selectivity 
that may enhance tensions among ethnic communities.391 However, this strongly 
depends on the state‟s commitment to translate its obligation to make effective 
reparations into reality. If this commitment has characterised the Chilean governments, 
the Burundian governments have not displayed any readiness to put forward victims‟ 
rights.  
 From the Peruvian experience, Burundi may learn the composition of the TRC 
and the compliance with international standards, including the TRC prosecution strategy 
and the transmission of a TRC list of alleged perpetrators to the judicial body as a way of 
TRC-Prosecutor collaboration. This did not erode the prosecutor‟s powers to undertake 
prosecutions on his or her initiative. The TRC list of perpetrators served as a 
complement. Burundi may learn from this practice and further consider the possibility for 
the judicial body to order satisfactory reparations for victims. 
 Secondly, the Peruvian process underscores the importance of collective 
reparations. As the identified victims were mainly the marginalised and poor groups, the 
collective reparations seemed appropriate to restore their community way of life, while 
providing them with opportunity to develop in dignity. This may be learnt as a good 
practice, since the Burundians recently consulted expressed their preference for 
collective reparations but also, the similarities of „sorry‟ situation of rural victims strongly 
recommend a similar approach. However, it has to go with individualised reparations for 
earlier mentioned reasons.  
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 Lastly, the Colombian case is also instructive. Not only Burundian TJ is 
negotiated in a context where there is no full-fledged transition towards an „emerging 
democracy‟, but the need for a judicial solution and the contribution of perpetrators are 
expressed in similar terms.392 Reparations in Colombia are based on judicial 
proceedings and involve a horizontal relation between the victim and the perpetrator. 
The later must avail the illegally and legally acquired assets for the repair of the victim, 
and the other members of the perpetrator‟s armed group are collectively liable, including 
the organisation itself, if the perpetrator‟s assets are not enough for just reparations for 
the victim.393 In the Burundian context the victim versus perpetrator confrontation is not 
advisable as the lack of efficient mechanisms of victims and witnesses‟ protection will 
put their life under serious threat.394 The innovative approach to compel perpetrators to 
fund victims‟ reparations should, however, be considered in addition to a state-funded 
reparations programme .395  
In sum, the globalisation of TJ and the similarity of victims‟ claims worldwide 
justify the importance of drawing lessons from foreign experiences and adapting them to 
local needs. While taking into account the specific background of Burundi, a holistic 
learning and combination of the cases explored in this study is likely to result in a sound 
programme of reparations.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
The findings of this study have been discussed in the previous chapter while identifying 
the lessons the above-discussed cases suggest for Burundi. This concluding chapter 
seeks to substantiate on recommendations, already discernible from the last section of 
chapter four, to the Burundian TJ role-players in relation to reparations. But before doing 
that, a case is made for reparative justice not only as a substantive component of TJ 
mechanisms but also with regards to its earlier place in the inevitable sequencing of the 
transitional mechanisms. This constitutes somewhat a response to the second research 
question of this inquiry, namely the way in which reparations may achieve justice in 
instances where conditions are not conducive for criminal accountability.  
 
5.2 Making a case for reparations 
In a time when tensions between [negative] peace and justice still exist, the success of 
TJ mechanisms needs innovative and accurate assessment of the pro and cons factors, 
both from a local context perspective and the international standards exigencies. It is 
suggested that reparations can do much work of reconciliation if enough attention is paid 
to victims‟ rights and inasmuch as the state is dedicated to secure benefits either 
through judicial channels, administrative programmes of reparations, or preferably both. 
Rights imply freedoms and entitlements, and their violation goes hand in hand with 
responsibility and costs. If the maxim ubi jus ubi remedium has a meaning, its practical 
manifestation should be more prompt when the state has failed to protect its citizens or, 
in worse instances, when its employees were actively involved in the violations. 
 Of course, truth will remain a prerequisite to design comprehensive reparations in 
all their aspects. Indeed, without an official track record of the violations that have been 
perpetrated, the forms they took, the nature of victimisation to which they led, the 
inventory of victims they produced; it is difficult to design a reparations‟ plan that would 
meet the expectations of the victims.  
 Thus, the sequencing of the TJ mechanisms in unstable societies becomes often 
inevitable, notwithstanding the uncompromised assertion that truth, justice and 
reparations are not mutually exclusive. Next to the truth, reparations are commendable 
to transitions that resulted from negotiations and compromises between new and old 
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political elites, tactical and pragmatic reasons support that reparative justice can 
provisionally give satisfaction to victims and empower them for an active participation as 
equal citizens in political processes. The prioritisation of reparations as an interim 
measure of justice to victims is supported by obvious reasons. 
 First, of the different mechanisms of TJ, reparations are the most victim-
orientated and give meaningful and concrete response to victims‟ needs, in the 
aftermath of rights violations which affected them in their lives, their dignity and their 
welfare. If truth provides them with satisfaction, truth is not an ultimate goal and should 
always be with consequences396 – namely reparations for victims and accountability for 
perpetrators. Equally, retributive justice has always been prosecuting selected 
perpetrators and focuses less attention to victims before the prosecutions are 
successfully closed. The new trends in international criminal justice also support the 
view that victims have been always neglected and need more attention.397 With 
reparations, justice gets a tangible meaning for victims and their reincorporation in the 
new political community becomes a reality. Unlike prosecutions which are forcedly 
selective, they aspire to attend to all victims.398 This is corroborated by the unfortunate 
situation where perpetrators seem economically better than the victims in „sorry‟ 
conditions, most of the time because of the way the former waged the conflict and the 
latter suffered from its horrors. In such dichotomy, comprehensive reparative plan is 
more suitable to shift the inequalities than slower transformative reconstruction 
strategies.399 
 Secondly, by their empowering potential, reparations restore victims‟ dignity and 
make them as „whole‟ again as possible. If they are well designed and implemented, 
substantive and procedural reparations are likely to shift the situation of victims from 
victimisation to active participation in the politics of a new future, including the 
enhancement of their long-term capabilities to come together and pursue further 
accountability against perpetrators.  This is important in the Burundian society where 
recurrence of violence has much to do with insufficient attention paid to victims and the 
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frustration that was subsequently developed against the „other‟ community, which easily 
led to a collective violence for revenge purposes.  
 Thirdly, beyond their function of compensating victims and rectifying the wrong 
they suffered, meaningful reparations can serve the purpose of deterrence traditionally 
associated with retribution. State-funded reparations may rightly be viewed as a sanction 
to the state which has failed to fulfill its responsibility to protect its citizens, since as non 
personae entities states cannot be held criminally accountable.400 This is not a simple 
rhetoric and the same function may be achieved against [individual] perpetrators by 
perpetrator-funded reparations. In fact, deterrence literature shows a correlation 
between the certainty of consequences and the reduction of offences, but little 
correlation between the severity of punishment and the reduced incidence of 
wrongdoing.401 Arguably, reparations are more certain than criminal sanctions. 
Moreover, reparations can equally serve the purposes of retribution and reconciliation.402 
 Fourthly, the prosecutorial and the reparative are both complementary elements 
of justice.403 As victims of diverse human rights abuses share almost similar 
circumstances of poverty, dependence on perpetrators for welfare, sentiment of rejection 
by the community and situation of powerlessness;404 their conception of justice may be 
synonymous to reparations that would empower and acknowledge their long-standing 
victimising situation. Building a new liberal society requires an endorsement of the ethics 
of responsibility that struck the balance between the normatively desirable and the 
contextually possible. In one way or another, this implies a dialogue and agreement 
between all survivors of an era of human rights violations, mainly victims and 
perpetrators, for a new beginning of the continuous history.405 Reparations are more 
suitable and acceptable by both parties to bridge this historical transition.  
 Lastly, opponents of reparations often criticise their backward looking and their 
partisan focus on a sole category of the society, namely the victims and their next of kin. 
They compete with equal needs of inclusive development and reconstruction plans that 
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advance all members of the society as a whole. In South Africa, the government‟s 
reluctance or resistance to design reparations that might call national and international 
companies in contribution has further been justified by the concern of an economic 
impact of debilitating or scaring them off. However, these arguments do not stand 
outside any political speculation. As far as South Africa is concerned, not every 
reparatory arrangement would have had catastrophic outcome on the economy, 
especially if a meaningful dialogue had been initiated between these companies, the 
government and the victims. Further, future-orientated politics do not exclude the 
needed room for reparative plans that take into account roots-orientated politics. Indeed, 
„the road to the future runs through the disasters of the past‟,406 since the past is never 
ended and that the dividing line between past, present and future is fleeting and 
arbitrary.407 As such, reparations policies aiming at coming to terms with the past are not 
only fixed on the past but also on the future. As regard to the argument of the inclusive 
development, it is argued that reparations are morally significant even if egalitarian and 
developmental claims support the same kind of demands. Indeed, development projects 
do not necessarily acknowledge the victimhood lack a reparative effect. They are not 
directed to victims as such and the state remains liable to offer development 
opportunities to its citizens, regardless of human rights abuses that occurred in the past 
and the victims they produced. Victims are additionally entitled to development benefits 
not for redressing the damage caused by past atrocities, but for present and future-
looking opportunities that every citizen is entitled to. 
 
5.3 Recommendations 
In light of the findings and lessons drawn from the cases studied, the following 
recommendations may address the question of „who‟, „how‟ and „what‟ in relation to the 
design and the implementation of reparations.  
The „who‟ question refers to the beneficiaries and the source of reparations 
funds. Reparations schemes should be directed at victims identified in a comprehensive 
way, as such lessons may be learnt from the Peruvian case. Victims are the key focus of 
any sound TJ mechanism and should be given the primary priority for reconciliation 
                                                          
406
 As above. 
407
 As above. 
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process. The definition of victims should be as inclusive as possible as to avoid any kind 
of selectivity which would amount to discrimination.  
Taking lesson from Colombia in relation to financing reparations, beyond the 
binding duty of the state to bear the cost of reparations, measures to avail the assets 
and properties of perpetrator organisations – which are still identifiable as political 
parties or state institutions – should be taken to increase the financial capacities of an 
anticipated victims‟ reparations fund. Moreover,  although reparations are an individual 
right of victims, collective reparations should be considered in light of the plight of 
poverty and their likelihood to have a structurally long-term and transformative impact on 
the Burundian society. This would allow for building a bridge between backward-looking 
reparations and future-oriented projects of development. It is important to remind that 
particular attention must be paid to vulnerable groups such as women, children, persons 
with disability, internally displaced persons, returnees and refugees. In this vein, 
necessary safeguards should be put in place from the outset to ensure that their voice is 
heard.  
This raises the next question of how to secure reparations. This brings to the 
procedural aspects of reparations design and delivery. Issues of victims‟ participation are 
crucial to any process of transitional justice. To that effect, Chilean practice of taking into 
account victims‟ views can be a starting lesson for further consultation and participation. 
The determination of who is involved should also be done in a transparent way with 
effective involvement of all victims and the civil society organisations, since different 
categories of victims may claim different types of reparations. As in Chile, there are 
grounds to categorise reparations programmes, since victims of sexual violence and 
extended torture may and indeed do have distinct needs with victims of forced 
displacement and land dispossession for instance.  The process of designing, 
implementing and monitoring reparations must therefore open opportunities for a 
meaningful engagement with various victims on an ongoing and equal basis. A 
government which claims to be democratic and seeks to do away with past bad 
practices, while ensuring a transition to a better future, should not regard demands of 
consultation as an embarrassing burden. This should rather be a prompt governmental 
attitude which would enhance a democratic culture of public participation.  
Once the questions of „who‟ and „how‟ are answered, the „what‟ cross-cutting 
dimension of reparations would respond to substantive aspects. In this regard, 
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notwithstanding the outcome of victims‟ ongoing consultation, programmes of 
reparations should address consequences of violations of, not only civil and political 
rights, but also economic, social and cultural rights. Issues such as access to the right to 
education as including public awareness and adult training, the right to an employment 
and equal treatment for equal work, equal access to resources and public services and 
their relation with the conflict should be thoroughly analysed. By so doing, the questions 
of inequalities and structural injustices as root causes of past violations of human rights 
would be looked into so as to design reparative responses in a long-term fashion, likely 
to guarantee non-repetition in the future.  
 Finally, it should be reminded that learning from earlier experiences does not 
only and exclusively mean taking best practices with due regard to local realities and 
needs, but also implies being aware of errors made in some instances so as to avoid 
them. To that effect, criticisms raised during the discussion of the country case studies 
such as victims participation, the definition of who is victim, the meaningfulness of 
reparations and the continuous updates of reparations pensions according to the 
inflation, etc. should be duly taken into account in the design, the implementation and 
the monitoring of TJ reparations in Burundi. 
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